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Self-Organizing Legal Systems: 
Precedent and Variation in Ba ptcy • 
Bernard Trujillo •• 
Models of legal ordering are frequently hierarchical. These models do not 
explain two prominent realities: (1) variation in the content of a legal system, and 
(2) patterns of non-hierarchical ordering that we observe. As a supplement to 
hierarchical explanations of legal order, this Article, drawing/rom physical and 
social science research on complex systems, offers a self-organizing model. The 
self-organizing model focuses on variation in the content of legal systems and 
attempts to explain the relationship between that variation and patterns of 
ordering. The self-organizing model demonstrates that variation and ordering are 
not opposite categories, but rather constitute one continuous phenomenon. 
Working with bankruptcy data and institutions, this Article describes self-
organizing structures as overlapping networks oflegal and extra-legal actors, and 
self-organizing dynamics as involving the twin processes of form innovation and 
norm emergence. This Article adduces empirical evidence (including a substantial 
case study and statistical analysis of a quantitative database) showing that 
bankruptcy is a self-organizing system. Finally, this Article suggests that self-
organization may state a general theory of trial court behavior, and that the self-
organizing model may illuminate legal research in areas such as discretion, 
doctrine, and legal change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS PRECEDENT? 
Lawyers and legal insiders know what a precedent is. Precedents happen 
every time a court takes a previously decided case as authority for disposing a yet-
to-be-decided case. From the insider's point of view, the more vital question is not 
"what is precedent?" but rather "what is the precedent for my case?" and perhaps, 
"how can I get around that precedent?" 
Now consider the phenomenon of precedent from the perspective of an 
outsider someone observing a legal system as she might observe an ecological 
system or an economic system. From this perspective, precedents are utterances 
that sort; that is, they allow players inside the legal system to categorize future 
utterances, thereby channeling the trajectory of an ongoing stream of data. The 
phenomenon at issue jn studying precedent, then, is the phenomenon of legal 
ordering. 
Taking the perspective of the outside observer, this Article asks: "What 
explains the ordering of a legal system's content?"1 If there are any discernible 
patterns among the data generated by a legal system, the thing to be explained is 
"where do those patterns come from?" 
There are at least three classifications of legal ordering. First, system content 
can be disordered, meaning that there are no discernible patterns.2 Second, content 
can be ordered by hierarchical means, such that hierarchical superiors (e.g., 
appellate courts or the President) issue directives· that are followed by hierarchical 
inferiors (e.g., trial courts or administrative agencies). Finally, content can be self-
organizing, meaning that we can explain patterns without primary reference to 
exogenous events (such as the directive of a hierarchical superior). 
Hierarchical models are the most conunon explanation oflegal ordering, and, 
in fact, such models do a very good job of accounting for much of the order we 
observe in legal systems.3 Our reliance on hierarchical explanations has, however, 
had some unfortunate effects. The focus on hierarchical ordering corresponds with 
a focus on appellate courts, so that trial courts' role in the ordering process is 
often neglected in legal research. This bias in favor of appellate courts "is 
1 The content of a legal system, defined broadly, includes any fonn in the legal system from 
a judge's published opinions to her in-chambers meetings; from an attorney's informal strategies 
and fonnal arguments, to a paralegal's route to the courthouse, to how late the clerk's office stays 
open on Tuesdays. See infra Part III.C (defining fotnts and notms that make up system content). All 
fonns are simply data that make up the system. 
21t is likely that the vast majority of fonns that I would include as system content lack any 
meaningful pattern. Disorder in system content can range from the relatively inconsequential to the 
quite substantial (think, for example, of the loose'canon judge). While this Article is concerned with 
the means of legal ordering, it is important to keep in mind that there is substantial disorder in legal 
systems, and that such patternlessness imposes real costs upon system participants. 
3See infra Part IV.B (examining hierarchical means of ordering bankruptcy system). 
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prominent in both theoretical expositions of precedent4 and empirical studies of 
precedent. 5 More troubling is the fact that a tendency to associate order with 
hierarchy can entail an erroneous identification of order with hierarchy, such that, 
when hierarchical means of ordering are defective, one comes to expect disorder. 6 
. 
4See, e.g., RUPERTCROSS&J.W. HARRIS,PRECEDENTINENGLISHLAW 5 (4thed. 1991). This 
basic text on precedent in common law systems represents that the "three constant features'' of 
precedent are: "[T]he respect paid to a single decision of a superior court, the fact that a decision 
of such a court is a persuasive precedent even so far as the courts above that from which it emanates 
are concerned, and the fact that a single decision is always a binding precedent as regards courts 
below that from which it emanated." /d. The role of trial courts, in Cross' account of precedent, is 
thus known only by negative inference: trial courts respect and are bound by appellate court 
decisions because trial courts are located "below" appellate courts. See_ id. 
5Many important empirical studies of precedent draw their data exclusively from the behavior 
of appellate courts. See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and 
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773, 773-74 (1981); Peter Harris, Ecology and Culture in the 
Communication of Precedent Among State Supreme Courts 1870-1970, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 449, 
451 ( 1985); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner~ Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 252 (1976); John Henry Merryman, The Authority of 
Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950,6 STAN. L. REV. 613,650-51 (1954); 
John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice 
of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381 (1977). 
Excellent empirical studies of trial courts (and other first-instance dispute resolution institutions), 
on the other hand, represent themselves as case studies of participant or institutional behavior, rather 
than as studies of the dynamics by which a legal system's content is ordered. See Richard Lempert, 
More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute Settlement Function" of Trial 
Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'YREV. 91, 130-31 (1978); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do 
Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. Svs. J. 151, 151, 157 (1984); Austin 
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'v 
REV. 93, _93, 95-96 (1986); Barbara Yngvesson, Legal Ideology and Community Justice in the 
Clerk's Office, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 71, 73-74 (1985). 
6The id~ntification of hierarchy with the good of order is what John Griffiths would call oo 
"ideological" rather than an "empirical" position. See John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 
J. LEGAL PLURALISM I, 3 ( 1986). Ideology, according to Griffiths, is a "mixture of assertions about 
how the world ought to be and a priori assumptions about how it actually and even necessarily is." 
/d. Empirical (or "descriptive," or "scientific") approaches to the study of law, on the other hand, 
take the phenomenon as the primary object of study, without entertaining questions about how the 
phenomenon ought to be or what it must "necessarily" be. See id. at 4-5. See also Marc Galanter, 
The Portable Soc 2; or, What to Do until the Doctrine Comes, in GENERAL EDUCATION IN THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
246,251-53 (John J. MacAloon ed., 1992) [hereinafter Galanter, The Portable Soc 2]. Galanter lists 
eight propositions of conventional legal studies, and notes that the listed propositions 
have a dual, composite character, fusing both descriptive and normative. They are 
thought to state what is normal and typical in legal systems to reflect the inherent and 
proper shape of legal reality. This fusion of factual and norn1ative assertion 
. . . establishes them as ideological statements statements about what a legal 
system ... ought to be like. 
/d. Studies of precedent and legal ordering are generally characterized by an "ideological" 
approach. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 51. 
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We can indeed explain a great deal about legal ordering by studying appellate 
court behavior and tracking hierarchical mechanics. But such a focus is partial, 
and therefore limiting and potentially distracting. When our travels are guided by 
incomplete maps, we are continually blindsided by the rest ofreality.7 Two 
prominent (and intimately related) realities are not explained by hierarchical 
models of legal ordering: ( 1) Variation . I will argue that the characteristic feature 
of a legal system's content is variation, and that this variation c~nnot adequately 
be explained by models of appellate control. (2) Non-hierarchical ordering. I will 
argue that the U .. S . . bankruptcy legal system presents a situation in which the 
mechanisms of hierarchical ordering and appellate control are substantially 
defective, and yet we observe significant ordering of the legal system's content. 
What accounts for ordering when hierarchy is defective or under-explanatory? We 
need a supplemental, non-hierarchical, model to explain more fully the 
phenomenon of legal ordering. 
This Article attempts to explain legal ordering among actors in the trial-
oriented sectors of a legal system, with a focus on bankruptcy law.8 As a 
supplement to hierarchical models, I offer a self-organizing model of legal 
systems. 
Part II presents the hierarchical model of legal ordering as a pyramid. It tests 
the hierarchical model against evidence generated by the bankruptcy system and 
finds that the model does not explain the evidence. The behavior of the 
. 
bankruptcy system is more complex than the simple hierarchical model predicts. 
Part II concludes by confronting the fact of variation a central feature of legal 
systems and a feature that hierarchical models of ordering cannot explain. 
Part III reviews the responses to variation that have constituted much of 
contemporary jurisprudence, and suggests a different research direction in which 
variation is the starting point of a constructive inquiry. It then reviews the 
literature on "local legal cultures" both in and beyond bankruptcy. Part III also 
interprets the existence of local legal cultures to be evidence of non-hierarchical 
ordering (i.e., the systematization of content variation such that variation becomes 
navigable), and asks how such ordering occurs. 
Part IV offers a self-organizing model of legal systems. Building on several 
lines of research from the physical and social sciences, it details an account of 
non-hierarchical legal ordering that explains (a) self-organizing structures as 
overlapping networks made up of actors connected by ties of varying strengths; 
and (b) self-organizing dynamics, comprising (1) an account of how multiple 
forms are generated (thus constituting variable system content); and (2) an account 
1See Galanter, Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 250-51 (developing "bad maps" analogy). 
8This Article explores the phenomenon of ordering in the context of bankruptcy courts, but 
the means of ordering observed there are also active in other types of courts, beyond court systems 
(e.g., in administrative agencies and legislative bodies), and in bureaucracy generally. See infra Part 
V.B. 
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of how particular fortns become norms (i.e., come to characterize system content), 
thus ordering system content. The model clarifies the relationship between 
variation and order, by showing how order proceeds from variation in the absence 
of hierarchical commands. . 
• 
Part V applies the self-organizing model to U.S. bankruptcy law. It shows 
how bankruptcy's networks are self-organizing structures. It presents empirical 
evidence offortn innovation and norm emergence in bankruptcy, drawing on (1) 
an extensive case study, and (2) statistical analysis of a quantitative database. 
Finally, Part V suggests that the self-organizing model extends beyond 
bankruptcy and states a general theory of legal ordering. This Article concludes 
with preliminary thoughts on how the self-organizing model might illuminate 
three basic problems of legal research: discretion, doctrine, and legal change. 
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II. HIERARCHICAL ORDERING AND THE FACT OF VARIATION 
A. The Pyramid Story 
• 
Supreme Court 
Intermediate AppeUate Courts 
Trial Courts 
What explains the ordering of a legal system's content? As we have seen, one 
valid way of answering this question is by reference to hierarchical mechanics.9 
~eliance on hierarchical mechanics is part of the more general bias of linearity in scientific 
measurement and explanation. Hierarchical models of legal ordering assert a proportional 
relationship between input variables and output variables the sort of relationship among variables 
that mathematics calls "linear." See DANIEL KAPLAN & LEON GLASS,, UNDERSTANDING NONLINEAR 
DYNAMICS 3-8 (1995); STEVEN H. STROGATZ, NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND CHAOS: WITH 
APPLICATIONS TO PHYSICS, BIOLOGY, CHEMISTRY, AND ENGINEERING 6 {Addison-Wesley 1994). 
The self-organizing model, presented infra Part IV.C., would allow (in its mathematical 
representations) for disproportional relationships among variables. Richard Abel, in a 1973 article, 
anticipated legal studies' tum to nonlinear models. See Richard L. Abel, Law Books and Books 
about Law, 26 STAN. L. REv. 17 5, 189 ( 1973) (suggesting that legal studies should "begin the 
construction of a more complex model in which law and behavior interact without a one-to-one 
correspondence") (book review). 
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Hierarchical explanations of adjudicative ordering tell a story about appellate 
control. Figure 1 displays the prototypical explanatory image: a three-storied 
pyramid of adjudication consisting of a supreme court at the top, intermediate 
appellate courts in the middle, and trial courts at the base. A pyramid explanation 
of legal ordering takes the following fortn: suppose an open doctrinal question 
(e.g., if old equity contributes new value, can it participate in the plan contrary to 
the absolute priority rule?). 10 Myriad cases are decided at the lowest levels of fact-
finding, none more precedential than the others. These cases state a variety of 
answers to the open doctrinal question (e.g., "yes,''11 "no,"12 "only if there was an 
auction first," 13 "only if the new value was over a certain sum,"14 "only if the new 
value met this list of five conditions,"15 etc.). These answers fill up the very many 
compartments constituting the broad base of the pyramid. Some of these cases are 
pushed up the pyramidal appellate structure, sending precedents back down as 
they ascend. One case gets decided by an intermediate appellate court and, as a 
result, a certain number of answers to the open doctrinal question become 
unavailable in a certain geography. This process continues until the ultimate court 
at the top of the pyramid answers the question. That answer travels down every 
level and enters every compartment of the pyramid, exalting one resolution and 
exterminating the rest. 16 Swords flash. Screams pierce the night. Then the hubbub 
of the pyramid subsides into silence. The pyramid is unifortn, the law is settled. 
10This is a question of bankruptcy doctrine that was allegedly resolved by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass 'n. v. 203 North LaSalle Street 
Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 457 (1999). The bankruptcy jargon translates as follows: "Old equity" 
describes the owners or shareholders of the corporation prior to the bankruptcy filing. See In re 
Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 1993). ''New value" most typically describes an 
injection of cash into the corporation after it has filed for bankruptcy, usually to help fund the 
corporation's plan of reorganization. /d. The "absolute priority rule" is a section of the Bankruptcy 
Code that requires the bankrupt corporation's reorganization plan to provide either full repayment 
to the parties that had unsecured claims against the corporation prior to bankruptcy, or no payment 
to old equity. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2000). The point of the absolute priority rule is to 
discourage old equity, who often write the plan, from retaining value at the expense of the finn's 
creditors. The policy behind the "new value exception" to the absolute priority rule is to force old 
equity to pay for retaining value in the reorganized finn. See Walter W. Miller, Jr., Bankruptcy's 
New Value Exception: No Longer a Necessity, 77 B.U. L. REv. 975,978-79 (1997). 
11See, e.g., In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d at 918. 
12See, e.g., In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners, L.P., 138 F.3d 39,46 (2d Cir. 1998). 
13See, e.g., In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1010 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). 
14See, e.g., In re Elmwood, Inc., 182 B.R. 845, 852-53 (D. Nev. 1995) (requiring that new 
capital infusion be ''substantial" under the circumstances). 
15See, e.g., In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 126 F.3d 955, 963 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding new 
value exception applies only if contribution of new capital is"( 1) new, (2) substantial, (3) necessary 
for the success of the plan, ( 4) reasonably equivalent to the value retained, and ( 5) in the fonn of 
money or money's worth"). 
160n the "extennination" features of law, see Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REv. 4, 40 44 (1983). 
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And that is the pyramid story. In this model, ordering occurs by means of a 
fortnal hierarchical structure. Significantly, this model predicts that if the fortnal 
mechanics of hierarchy was disrupted if, for example, the appellate courts did 
not exert substantial control over trial court doctrine then one would observe a 
substantial lack of ordering in that legal system. 
B. Testing the Pyramid: Bankruptcy Law 
The pyramid story presents a hierarchical model of legal ordering. Now we 
test that model and its predictions by comparing the pyramid story to the workings 
of a real legal system: U.S. bankruptcy law. Our intention is to determine whether 
the pyramid model of ordering is an accurate representation of actual system 
ordering. 
A brief introduction to the chief features of the bankruptcy legal system is 
appropriate. Bankruptcy law is federal law, with a very complicated and 
comprehensive statute known as the "Bankruptcy Code" that occupies the entirety 
ofTitle 11 of the United States Code. Bankruptcy has its own courts ("bankruptcy 
courts") 17 staffed by Article I judges ("bankruptcy judges")18 who are typically 
highly trained in the complex field. These judges are appointed to fourteen-year 
terms by the regional court of appeals. 19 Finally, opinions of bankruptcy courts are 
reported by West Publishing, and are easily accessible. 
One feature of the bankruptcy system is of particular interest here: the 
bankruptcy appellate structure generates very few decisions that bind future cases 
as a matter of formal, hierarchical precedent. The vast majority of decisions in 
bankruptcy serve as nothing more than the law of the case. Indeed, the common 
wisdom of bankruptcy scholars and professionals is that the bankruptcy system 
in the U.S. makes too little precedent.20 As the balance of this Article will show, 
I believe that characterization is controversial. But it is an unquestionably correct 
observation that nearly all bankruptcy cases terminate at a level where no fortnal 
precedent is made. 21 There are very few appeals out of bankruptcy court, and only 
an infinitesimal number of cases are appealed to the level where the results 
formally bind other bankruptcy judges. 22 
Two facts constitute this bankruptcy appeals problem. First, only opinions 
of the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court bind bankruptcy courts 
by reason of formal hierarchy. Second, there are dramatically few opinions from 
1728 u.s.c. § 151 (2000). 
18/d. § 152. 
19Jd. 
20See infra text accompanying notes 36-39, 43-52. 
21See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy 
Code, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1091 (1994). 
22ld. 
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the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court relative to the total number 
of bankruptcy cases in the system. These two facts are discussed in the next two 
sections with the aid of figures. 
1. The institutional glitch in the bankruptcy appeals process 
Fi&ure 2 
United States Supreme Court level 0 
.. . Fifth Sixth Eighth Ninth •.. 
Seventh Circuit level( 
Illinois Indiana 
Wisconsin 
Dist.Ct.#l 
Shabaz 
Oist.Ct.#2 
Crabb 
Oist.Ct.#l Oist.Ct.#2 Oist.Ct.#3 Dist.Ct.#4 level 8 
Randa Clevert Adelman 
Bankruptcy Ct. 11 Bankruptcy Ct. #2 Bankruptcy Ct. #1 Bankruptcy Ct.i2 Bankruptcy Ct. #3 level A 
Martin Utschig Eisenberg Shapiro McGarity 
Figure 2 depicts a segment of the federal court system, showing for 
illustrative purpos.es the projected appellate path of a bankruptcy action initiated 
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in Wisconsin. 23 A litigant would begin in a bankruptcy court in Wisconsin ("Level 
A" in the Figure), move up to the district courts of Wisconsin ("Level B"),24 then 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ("Level C''), and finally to 
the U.S. Supreme Court ("Level D"). The bankruptcy appeals problem comes 
from the fact that every decision by every court in Level A and Level B creates 
nothing more than the law of the case. Unremarkably, the decision of one judge 
does not bind another judge horizontally, along either Level A (Martin cannot 
bind Utschig) or Level B (Crabb cannot bind Shabaz). More surprising is the fact 
that one judge cannot bind another vertically, from Level B to Level A (i.e., 
decisions by Crabb do not bind Martin, except for decisions in those particular 
cases actually appealed from Martin to Crabb). The first point at which a court 
might utter something more than the law of the case is at Level C, by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 25 If a litigant in Madison believes it has 
an important bit of law to clarify, it would have to first file and litigate at Level 
23The "bankruptcy appellate panel" (''BAP") is not illustrated in, Figure 2. The BAP is a panel 
of three bankruptcy judges that can hear appeals, on the consent of both parties, from the decision 
of bankruptcy courts. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 5.02[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2003) [hereinafter 1 COLLIER]. Appeals from BAPs go to the courts of 
app_eals (BAPs would.thus displace district courts as "Level B" in the figure). See id. ~ 5.02[4]. 
Despite an express congressional policy in favor of BAPs, only the First and Ninth Circuits make 
full use ofBAPs. /d.~ 5.02[3]. Four circuits (Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth) make limited use 
of BAPs, and six circuits (Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C.) have decided not to 
have SAPs. /d.; NAT'LBANKR. REV. COMM'N, 1 REPORTOFTHENATIONALBANKRUPTCYREVIEW 
COMMISSION § 3.13(F)-(H), at 764--66 ( 1997) (hereinafter 1 NBRC REPORT]. BAPs do not help to 
consolidate doctrine in the bankruptcy system because the BAP opinion, just like the bankruptcy 
court opinion and the district court opinion, states only the law of the case. and does not bind future 
cases as a matter of hierarchy. See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved 
issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 531 (1995) 
("[W]hatever arguments can be made. ~n support of the creation of a bankruptcy appellate panel, the 
development of binding precedent is not one of them."). 
24Bankruptcy courts are technically departments of federal district courts. 1 COLLIER, supra 
note 23, ~ 2.02[ 1]. The 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code gave bankruptcy judges broad 
jurisdiction, but did not grant them Article III status. !d. ~ 2.0 I [2][b ]. In 1982 the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that arrangement unconstitutional. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding unconstitutional Congress' grant of broad jurisdiction to non-
Article III bankruptcy judges). Congress responded in 1984 by enacting a complicated jurisdictional 
scheme that clarified the fact that bankruptcy court jurisdiction was dependent upon a grant of 
district court jurisdiction. 1 COLLIER, supra note 23, 1J3.0 I [2][b ]. 
25The proposed "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003" 
contains a provision that would allow decisions ofba~ptcy courts to be directly appealed to the 
courts of appeals, thus bypassing the costly stopover at the district court. See H.R. 975, 1 08th Cong. 
§ 1233 (2003) (proposing to amend 28 U . .S.C. § 158 to allow direct appeals). See generally Judith 
A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative_ Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. 
BANKR . L.J. 625,625-26 (2002) (discussing findings ofstudy conducted by Federal Judicial Center 
and possible policy prescriptions). 
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A, then appeal and litigate at Level B, and then appeal and litigate at Level C.26 
Only after two appeals and three levels of litigation might the litigant achieve a 
judgment that will bind future cases as a matter of the fonnal operation of 
hierarchical precedent. 27 
This feature of bankruptcy appellate structure is perhaps explained by the 
relationship between federal district courts and bankruptcy courts. 28 Since 
bankruptcy courts are formally departments of district courts, one could say that 
there is no vertical dimension describing bankruptcy courts and district courts. 
The surprising lack of vertical precedent is really just a function of the 
unremarkable lack of horizontal precedent among district courts. 29 But bankruptcy 
court judges, while fortnally identified with the district courts, are not actually 
identical to district court judges. Fonnally, bankruptcy judges are like the federal 
magistrates appointed by district courts, in that they exercise authority granted to 
them by the district court.30 But actually, bankruptcy judges maintain a judicial 
identity substantially separate from district court judges. Congress has created a 
court system containing multiple judicial personalities within the same identity. 31 
It is perhaps unsurprising that this creature has behaved pathologically. 
26lt is possible for bankruptcy actions to initiate in district court in those circumstances where 
the district court has expressly "withdrawn the reference," i.e., the standing device that sends all 
cases filed under Title II to the bankruptcy court qua department of the district court. See I 
COLLIER, supra note 23,, 3.02[1]. Withdrawing the reference is extremely unusual. So as a general 
matter, bankruptcy cases begin (and, as we will see, almost always end) in bankruptcy court. 
27Bankruptcy litigants best positioned to make law by pursuing appeals are thus limited to the 
sophisticated, the well-funded, and the repeat players: viz. participants in business bankruptcies and 
corporate lenders in the consumer market (such as lenders on car loans and credit cards). 
28Reasons for the lack of hierarchical precedent running vertically from district courts to 
bankruptcy courts (along with norntative arguments urging bankruptcy court judges to be good 
sports and act as if they were bound by district courts) have been explored elsewhere. See generally 
Busse!, supra note 21, at 1 064 (arguing for "functional inquiry into the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of various bodies in a non-traditionally organized adjudicative system"); John P. 
Hennigan, Jr., Appealability Regularized: The NBRC's Proposals and Current Legislative Issues, 
7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 415 passim (1998) (discussing and recommending changes of finality 
requirement for appeals from bankruptcy courts); Jeffrey J. Brookner, Note, Bankruptcy Courts and 
Stare Decisis: The Need for Restructuring, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 313,327-28 (1993) (arguing 
that bankruptcy courts should follow district court precedent); John H. Maddock III, Note, 
Stemming the Tide of Bankruptcy Court Independence: Arguing the Case for District Court 
Precedent, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 507 passim (1994) (same). 
29/n re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551,555 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor (In 
re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236,241-43 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. I99I); see Bussel, supra note 2I, at 1071; 
see also Honorable Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy Cases, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287,296-97 (1993) (noting it takes two appeals to create 
precedent). 
30See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2000). 
31See supra note 24 (Congress' response to Marathon case). 
496 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2004: 483 
2. The near void of formally precedential bankruptcy opinions 
Figure 3 
(see following page) 
• 
Figure 3 is a rough proportional representation of the number of cases 
disposed at each of the four levels of the system. These data are from 2001.32 As 
shown in Figure 3, at the bankruptcy court level (i.e., "Level A") for that year 
there were 1,43 7,354 cases; at the district court level (i.e., "Level B") there were 
2519; at the court of appeals level (i.e., "Level C") there were 482 cases; at the 
Supreme Court level (i.e., "Level D") there was one case.33 The data are arrayed 
in Figure 3 in the shape of a very bottom-heavy pyramid, with the Supreme Court 
case occupying the small pointy head of the pyramid and the bankruptcy court 
cases occupying the broad, wildly disproportionate base of the pyramid.34 
322001 ADMlN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS. ANN. REP., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 75 tbl.B-1, 133 tbl.C2-A, 257 tbl.F, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. 
33The sole U.S. Supreme Court case that year was Gitlitz v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 5 31 U.S. 206, 215- 16 (200 1) (discussing tax consequences of bankruptcy discharge). 
More typically, there are two or three bankruptcy cases on the U.S. Supreme Court docket in any 
• g1ven year. 
34A very important qualification is needed h~re: counting bankruptcy cases will both 
overcount and undercount bankruptcy disputes. In bankruptcy, a case is everything brought before 
the court in the matter of a particular debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § § 301-304. In big business bankruptcy, 
there could be hundreds of disputes brought under the umbrella of a single case. In consumer 
bankruptcy, there are many thousands of cases filed, but very few of them result in the adjudication 
of an actual dispute. The closest measure we have for actual disputes in bankruptcy is the annual 
number of adversary proceedings. See FED. R. BANKR. P ., 700 1-7087. See generally Elizabeth 
Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (Forthcoming 
2004). For 2001, there were 67,140 adversary proceedings initiated in bankruptcy courts, of which 
all but 8079 were tenninated in bankruptcy courts. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 32, 263 tbl.F-8. 
The data do not support a conclusion regarding how many of the 8079 were appealed past the 
district court level, i.e., to the point where the court of appeals could issue a hierarchically binding 
precedent. If you replace the data on cases with the data on adversary proceedings, the general 
point stands (i.e., there are more non-precedential than precedential decisions), but the dramatic 
nature of the statistics weakens. 
No.2] SELF-ORGANIZING LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Fieure 3 
1-----~ 
482----
2,519 
1,437,354 
497 
LeveiD 
Level( 
LevelS 
Level A 
Combining the lesson of Figure 2 (only Level C and Level D opinions create 
precedents that bind future decisions as a matter of fortnal hierarchical precedent) 
with the lesson of Figure 3 (nearly all of the cases are at Level A and, to a much 
smaller extent, Level B) suggests that there may be a dearth of hierarchically 
precedential opinions in U.S. bankruptcy law. One way to sullllnarize the 
combined lessons of the two figures is to look at the proportion of hierarchically 
precedential cases in the system ( 483) to the non-hierarchically precedential cases 
(1 ,439,873), which describes a ratio of .0003354. That is, there are just over three 
one-hundredths of one percent as many hierarchically precedential cases as there 
are cases that never make law.35 
35Despite the extreme nature of this ratio, there is likely nothing unusual about the distribution 
of cases represented in Figure 3. The ratio of precedent cases to law-of-the-case cases in bankruptcy 
is probably substantially similar to the ratio in other substantive bodies of law. I claim not that 
bankruptcy law is unique, but rather that bankruptcy presents a useful case study of a general 
phenomenon: viz. the limits of hierarchy for explaining the ordering of legal content. See infra Part 
IV.B. 
• 
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Various reasons have been advanced to explain why nearly all bankruptcy 
cases tertninate in bankruptcy court. One obvious reason is that the extra layer of 
appeals creates a financial disincentive for the party choosing a litigation 
strategy.36 There are also significant procedural hurdles to appeal: the doctrines 
of finality37 and mootness38 deliver a potent one-two punch to any litigant wishing 
to pursue a litigation strategy that involves appeals. Bankruptcy cases are typically 
sprawling, complicated affairs, with very few isolatable parts. Frequently it is 
difficult to get a final, appealable judgment on any part of a bankruptcy case until 
the point at which the entire case is resolved. But often by the time an issue 
achieves finality, an appeal on that issue would be barred as moot. 39 
Alongside these important technical reasons for the lopsided distribution of 
cases within the bankruptcy system are two reasons which might be tertned 
cultural. First, bankruptcy is understood in legal culture to be an intricate and 
complicated specialty subject, something along the order of tax law. Most non-
bankruptcy practitioners would delightedly go an entire career without ever 
having to pick up a copy of the Bankruptcy Code, and district court judges are 
often only too happy to farm out the bankruptcy cases on the docket. On the 
remarkably rare occasion that a bankruptcy case is successfully appealed to the 
rarefied atmosphere of a court of appeals or the Supreme Court, the bankruptcy 
issues in the case are often not engaged at all. As often as not, the appellate court 
will use the bankruptcy case as a vehicle to talk about something else, most 
typically separation of powers, federalism, and statutory interpretation.40 
Bankruptcy cases stay in bankruptcy courts, on this account, because bankruptcy 
issues gravitate to the point where they are understood and properly addressed. 
The second cultural reason that bankruptcy cases stay in bankruptcy court 
involves what might be called the self-adjusting nature of bankruptcy 
36See Rhodes, supra note 29 (noting that it takes two appeals to get precedent). 
37 A trial court ruling is not appealable until the litigation is concluded on the merits via the 
entry of a judgment. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); 15A-B CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3905-3915 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 
2003). ' 
38 A trial court ruling is not appealable if its adjudication has been rendered moot or 
unnecessary by the operation of other events. In a complex bankruptcy case, issues are regularly 
rendered moot through ancillary rulings by the court that reduce or eliminate the amount of the 
claim or the size of the estate that would have been used to satisfy the claim. 
39 See Busse], supra note 21, at 1070 ("It is an irony of bankruptcy practice that an order may 
be non-appealable on finality grounds until it becomes non-appealable on mootness grounds!''). See 
also Daniel J. Busse I, Textualism 's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. 
L. REV. 887, 918-19 (2000) [hereinafter Bussel, Failures] (same). 
40Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (statutory 
construction); see, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 45 (1994) (federalism); 
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,757,762 ( 1992) (separation of powers, statutory construction); 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,414 (1992) (statutory construction). The troubled relationship 
between bankruptcy courts and appellate courts is studied more fully infra Part V.A.2. 
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adjudication. Bankruptcy cases, sprawling, complicated, with multiple parties and 
myriad interrelated issues, are as often "hashed out" in the presence of the judge 
as they are decided by the judge.41 Parties do not appeal out of bankruptcy court 
because they value the flexibility of the forum and they prefer to negotiate for 
what they want. Bankruptcy judges directing these proceedings are called upon 
to be both managers and umpires.42 
C. The Broken Pyramid: Variation 
We have seen that bankruptcy's institutional conditions make it difficult to 
generate a hierarchically binding precedent and that, indeed, the system generates 
very few. But we have not yet made the case that the hierarchical mechanics of 
appellate control fails to order fully the content of the bankruptcy legal system. 
Figure 3 shows a very bottom-heavy pyramid, but it may not necessarily show 
that the appellate mechanism in bankruptcy is malfunctioning. The fact that such 
a great proportion of all bankruptcy cases terminate in bankruptcy court could 
actually indicate the opposite of a malfunctioning appellate mechanism: one 
would expect that, in a working hierarchical system, there would be very few 
appeals because the law is uniforn1, settled, and transparent. 
To complete the argument that the bankruptcy pyramid is broken, that the 
hierarchical mechanism does not fully explain ordering, we must observe not only 
a low number of cases that bind as a matter of hierarchy, but also a substantial 
amount of variation in the way that different bankruptcy courts resolve identical 
issues. The consensus among bankruptcy practitioners, doctrinal scholars, and 
empirical scholars is that we do indeed observe such variation.43 This clear fact of 
41See Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 246 
( 1991 ). Jones states that: 
/d. 
[B]ankruptcy, unlike ordinary civil litigation, contains self-adjusting aspects that may 
make appeals unnecessary. Many of the court's decisions are discretionary and hence 
revocable. Moreover, in the natural course of a bankruptcy proceeding, an early adverse 
decision suffered by a party may be corrected during negotiations or decisions in a later 
part of the case. 
42See generally E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 306, 322-26 (1986) (discussing evolution of managerial judging); Stacy Kleiner 
Humphries & Robert L.R. Munden, Painting a Self-Portrait: A Look at the Composition and Style 
of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 74 (1997) (contrasting traditional role of judges 
as "umpires" with trend toward "managerial judging"); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REv. 374, 376-80 (1982) (discussing shift of judges toward managerial role). 
43Variation in bankruptcy system content is discussed extensively infra Parts III.A.l and 
III.B.l. See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 23, at 526-27 (noting that there is lack of settled rules 
in bankruptcy law); Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 
67 AM. BANKR.L.J. 501,532 (1993) (chronicling floor variation between cities); Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1498, 
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variation is, however, open to a range of interpretations. And that is where things 
get interesting. 
Ill. RESPONSES TO VARIATION 
. , 
• • • 
A. Interpreting Variation 
Variation has been the touchstone of much of modem jurisprudence. We 
have noticed variation and tried to ignore it; we have declared it a threat to the 
rule of law that must be exterminated; we have tried politely to explain it away; 
we have wielded it like a hammer to smash the system and begin again. 
Taking bankruptcy law as a case study, this Part discusses some 
interpretations of the fact of variation in legal systems, and then suggests a 
different approach. 
1. Variation as pathology or passing thing 
Upon observing variation in the doctrinal content of bankruptcy law, many 
scholars and practitioners interpret that variation as incoherence comprising a per 
se threat to the rule of law. The Report of the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission ("NBRC") provides an excellent vantage point from which to glean 
the received wisdom regarding the state of bankruptcy law.44 In the section of the 
NBRC's report recommending direct appeals of bankruptcy matters to a court of 
appeals, the NBRC anxiously treats the question of appellate control.45 After 
detailing the structural characteristics in the bankruptcy appellate process, 46 the 
NBRC proclaims that "[s]tare decisis is a fundamental tenet of our common law 
1506-07 ( 1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads] (discussing systematic legal 
differences between cities); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Demographics of Bankruptcy, 63 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 289 (1989) (discussing demographics of bankruptcy practice); Teresa A. Sullivan et al. , The 
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years ofEvidencefrom the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994) [hereinafter Sullivan et al., Persistence] (discussing 
"local legal authority"); Symposium on Uniformity of Bankruptcy, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. I 
( 1998); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as 
Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 
406-09 (1994) (noting "extreme variation in filing rates around the country"). 
44In 1994, Congress commissioned the NBRC to prepare a report on the nation's bankruptcy 
laws. 1 NBRC REPORT, supra note 23, at iv-vi. In October of 1997, after fifteen months of 
numerous public hearings and meetings, the NBRC submitted its report to Congress. /d. While the 
specific recommendations for reform were hotly contested and ultimately politicized in a high-
stakes and richly funded lobbying effort by the credit industry, the NBRC's report is taken to be the 
most comprehensive recent survey regarding the status of U.S. bankruptcy. ld. at vi- vii. 
45 !d. § 3.13, at 752-54. 
46/d. 
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system" and that the "problems that arise from a lack of effective stare decisis . 
. . can not be overestimated. "47 The NBRC continues: 
Without a predictable outcome on even the most basic issues, 
negotiations outside of court are skewed, creating more litigation. 
Currently, case law can be found to support virtually any position on 
any issue and as a result, wasteful litigation ensues. 
Many ... bankruptcy court opinions are published in a separate West 
and other reporters devoted to bankruptcy cases. Many bankruptcy 
opinions from the district courts are also published. The consequence 
is that about fourteen volumes of opinions of West's Reporter alone, 
few of which are binding on any other future case, are published each 
year. Practitioners assert that it is possible to find a bankruptcy opinion 
to support any legal proposition and any side of a legal proposition. As 
a result, no binding precedent exists in some circuits on certain 
fundamental bankruptcy issues.48 
The practice of bankruptcy law, it would seem, must be in a very un-law-like 
state of perpetual and fundamental uncertainty. In this view, bankruptcy law is a 
sort of war zone, and its practitioners can most often be found hiding beneath their 
desks waiting fearfully for the next totally unpredictable event.49 There is no 
shortage of commentators proclaiming the fundamental incoherence ofbankruptcy 
law, and examples can be multiplied. 5° 
I 
. 
47/d. § 3.13, at 754 (emphasis added). The NBRC uses the term ~~stare decisis" to refer to the 
principle by which judicial decisions bind the proceedings of hierarchically inferior courts. See id. 
48/d. § 3.13, at 754-55 (citing Baisier & Epstein, supra note 23, at 526-27 n.9). See also 
Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform 
of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 173, 199 (2000) ("[T]he worst thing to happen to bankruptcy practice was the decision in 1978 
to begin publishing bankruptcy judges' opinions .... [O]ne can find authority in the case law these 
days for virtually any proposition."). 
49 A less dramatic version of the perpetual uncertainty thesis manifests itself in the anecdotal 
understanding that "courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity." Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295, 304-08 (1939). This notion that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity is widely held 
despite its extremely tenuous provenance. See HonoraQle Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy 
Court is a Court of Equity H: What Does that Mean?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 277-86 (1999) 
(demonstrating that bankruptcy courts are substantially unrelated to traditions of equity in 
development of U.S. law). 
50 See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 23, at 526-28 n.9 (listing as examples of incoherence lack 
of resolution on four important issues in business bankruptcies); Bussel, supra note 21, at 1076-77 
(listing ten areas where bankruptcy court has disagreed with district court or BAP decision on same 
issue); Rhodes, supra note 29, at 290-93 (listing unresolved issues); Daniel J. Bussel, Bankruptcy 
Appellate Reform: Issues and Options, 1995-1996 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 257,261-62 (listing five 
areas of "unsettled law"). 
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I suggest that reports of bankruptcy law's disintegration have been greatly 
exaggerated. Later I shall show that the variation in bankruptcy doctrine exhibits 
concrete and navigable patterns, but for now it is interesting to wonder what 
explains the diagnoses of the doomsayers. Why are these people projecting 
incoherence on this legal system?.The answer, I believe, is that they are seeing 
what they expect to see. They subscribe to a hierarchical mechanics explanation 
ofprecedential ordering, a sort of precedent ex machina.51 If one identifies order 
with hierarchy, and then one notices that the hierarchy is defective, then one 
anticipates disorder. Thus the conviction of those who maintain that a legal system 
with a malfunctioning appellate mechanism is a system doomed to doctrinal 
incoherence. Precedent, on this view, is a product of hierarchy. If there is no 
hierarchy, there can be no precedent. Chaos closes in. 52 
51 This account of precedent is the dominant theory among mainstream legal theory. See, e.g., 
IB JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 0.401, at 1-2 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 1996) ("As applied in a hierarchical system of courts, the duty of a subordinate court 
to follow the laws as announced by superior courts is theoretically absolute."). For contemporary 
examples of legal and social science scholars assuming hierarchy as an unargued and essential facet 
of the legal system, see Bussel, supra note 21, at 1074 (characterizing some bankruptcy court 
opinions to hold that ''the rule of stare decisis is a deduction from the hierarchical nature of the 
judicial system and a related interest in judicial economy"); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior 
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994) (justifying the 
"longstanding doctrine [that] dictates that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established 
by a court 'superior' to it"); Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal 
Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 L. & Soc. REV. 143, 143-44 (2003) ("[T]he federal 
judicial hierarchy is designed to enable the Supreme Court, sitting at the system's apex, to impose 
its collective will on lower federal judges."); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-
Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1605, 
1607-08 (1995) (explaining features he observes "[i]n virtually all judicial systems," viz. the 
' 
"vertical aspects of a system of precedent [in which] the lower (courts are obliged] to follow the 
decisions of a higher court"). The commitment to the "hierarchical nature of the judicial system" 
that characterizes the above-cited works is what Griffiths would call an ideological position, i.e., 
' 
a "mixture of assertions about how the world ought to be and a priori assumptions about how it 
actually and even necessarily is .... " See Griffiths, supra note 6, at 3. Galanter's list of eight 
-ideological propositions that dominate conventional legal scholarship contains an entry on 
hierarchy. See Galanter, The Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 252 ("6. Normative statements, 
institutions, and officials are arranged in hierarchies, whose members have different levels of 
authority. A. 'Higher' elements direct (design, evaluate) activity; 'lower' ones execute activity. B. 
Higher elements control (guide) lower ones."). 
52 See, e.g., Busse I, supra note 21, at l 087-88. 
[D ]elegating [the job of being the principal expositors ofbankruptcy law] to bankruptcy 
courts results in chaotic law development. No mechanism for reconciling disparate 
'reasonable' interpretations of law exists. In the case of administrative agencies with 
internal hierarchies and nationwide jurisdiction, of course, this 'chaos' problem is not 
present. But in a bankruptcy system relying upon hundreds of co-ordinate and 
decentralized adjudicators resolving cases, a large dose of uncertainty is unavoidable, 
and chaos [is] a plausible outcome. 
/d. (emphasis added). 
No.2] SELF-ORGANIZING LEGAL SYSTEMS 503 
These commentators are, I suggest, victims of the pyramid story. Variation 
in doctrinal content, which is in fact endemic and quotidian, gets framed into 
being a problem. In this view, variation is either a passing thing or a pathology. 
Where variation is a passing thing, it is considered to be only temporary the 
hierarchical mechanics merely has not yet ·gotten around to consolidating a bit of 
doctrine. Where variation is a pathology, it is understood as a sort of exception, 
telling us nothing about the normal functioning of a legal system in the same way 
that a cancer tells us nothing about the normal functioning of the body. In either 
case, variation is idealized away. The pyramid story thus interprets variation by 
defining away its centrality in the everyday life of a legal system. 
2. Centering variation: indeterminacy and what follows 
Against the instinct to idealize away variation, there runs an opposite 
tendency. This tendency, associated with the Legal Realists and Critical Legal 
Studies, gives variation a central role. 
An important trilogy of articles by Karl Llewellyn, Stewart Macaulay, and 
Duncan Kennedy demonstrates the ways in which variation can be taken 
seriously. In 1950, Llewellyn claimed that "[i]n the work of a single opinion-day 
I have observed 26 different, describable ways in which one of our best state 
courts handled its own prior cases, repeatedly using three to six different ways 
within a single opinion."53 In a classic statement of the Legal Realist position, 
Llewellyn continues: 
What is important is that all 26 ways (plus a dozen others which 
happened not to be in use that day) are correct. They represent not 
"evasion," but sound use, application and development of precedent. 
They represent not "departure from," but sound continuation of, our 
system of precedent as it has come down to us. The major defect in that 
system is a mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it to wit, 
the idea that the cases themselves and in themselves, plus the correct 
rules on how to handle cases, provide one single correct answer to a 
disputed issue of law. In fact the available correct answers are two, 
three, or ten. The question is: Which of the available correct answers 
will the court select and why? For since there is always more than one 
available correct answer, the court always has to select. 54 
53 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
about How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 396 (1950). 
54/d. Note that Llewellyn's fonnulation is expressly empirical rather than ideological: our 
system of precedent is what it is; "[t]he major defect in that system is a mistaken idea which many 
lawyers have about it." !d. (emphasis added). 
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In a characteristically delightful exercise, Llewellyn (taking cases on statutory 
construction as an example) then detailed twenty-eight positions announced by 
courts. Side-by-side with these, Llewellyn presented their twenty-eight opposites, 
also announced by courts. 55 Where some see incoherence, Llewellyn sees only a 
complex system at work. · 
In an article sixteen years later, Macaulay observed substantial variation in 
the way courts construed a set of contracts cases. 56 Unlike Llewellyn however, 
Macaulay did more than observe that the body of doctrine was variable. He also 
devised a sense-making scheme (based on policy objectives and implementation 
mechanisms imputed to judges) which he superimposed upon the data in an 
attempt resolve the apparent variation into some sort of system. 57 
Ten years after the Macaulay article, Kennedy walked the same road. After 
observing variation generally across contract law cases, Kennedy proposed a 
different, now very familiar, sense-making scheme: 
If the judges had neither derived the common law rules from the 
concepts nor applied them mechanically to the facts, then what had they 
been doing? ... [T]hey had been legislating and then enforcing their 
economic biases. The legal order represented not a coherent 
individualist philosophy, but concrete individualist economic interests 
dressed up in gibberish. 58 
Like Macaulay, Kennedy superimposed a scheme to systematize the observed 
variation. 59 But then Kennedy went on to deplore the scheme he superimposed.60 
In these three important works, I want to point out one distinction and one 
continuity. The distinction lies in the authors' choice of whether to superimpose 
a sense-making scheme upon the variable content of doctrine. Macaulay and 
Kennedy elect for superimposition, and Llewellyn does not. It is interesting that 
Llewellyn offers no explanation for the variation he observes. He makes no 
attempt to make doctrinal contradiction seem to make sense. He seems frankly 
unconcerned that contradiction exists at all, and even slightly amused by those 
who are troubled. If Llewellyn offers an interpretation, it is not at the level of the 
55/d. at 401-06. 
56Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read Business Run by IBM 
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 V AND. L. REV. 1051 ( 1966). 
57/d. at I 056-57 (offering categories of rules and standards, and identifying market goals and 
"other than market" goals). 
58Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1749 ( 1976). 
59/d. at 1762-66 (applying individualistic and altruistic model as basis to explain 
observations). 
60/d. at 1774-76. 
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legal system's content (e.g., "when you consider my sense-making scheme, which 
elaborates the micro-rationalities of particular adjudicators, what appeared to be 
variable and contradictory now seems systematic, albeit deplorable") but rather 
at the level of the legal system's dynamics. Content variation, on Llewellyn's 
view, is ~veryday grist for the mill of a working complex legal system.61 
For the moment, however, I am more interested in how the Llewellyn-
Macaulay-Kennedy trilogy is continuous: they all treat variation as a fundamental 
attribute of legal systems. It is this recognition of the centrality of variation that 
distinguishes the Realist and Critical perspective from the tradition of doctrinal 
legal scholarship that preceded legal realism. 62 
What I am calling variation in doctrinal content, the Critical scholars define 
as "indeterminacy"63 and "contradiction. "64 The Crits' recognition of 
indeternlinacy is grounded in a metaphysical claim and proceeds toward a 
pragmatic program. The metaphysical claim is that reality is socially 
constructed.65 The pragmatic program recommends that we tum our attention 
away from the bootless divining of laws or patterns, and focus instead on policy 
. 
61 For what it is worth, this Article follows Llewellyn. I observe content variation, but offer 
no micro-rational sense-making scheme. Instead, I am interested in content-level variation in order 
to explore legal systems at the macro-level of structure and dynamics. See infra Part V.B. 
62See David M. Trubek & John Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: 
Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box?, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 3, 9 (1989) [hereinafter Trubek & 
Esser, Critical Empiricism] (stating Legal Realists "showed that legal doctrine was indetern1inant 
and contradictory, thus demonstrating that doctrinal considerations could not explain legal 
outcomes. The Realists' 'discovery' of the indetenninacy of legal doctrine posed a threat to 
mainstream themes of legal autonomy, neutrality, and rationality, as well as to the bases for 
scholarly authority.''). 
63See DavidM. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. 
L. REV. 575, 578 (1984) [hereinafter Trubek, Where the Action Is] (stating that critics assert 
"doctrine neither provides a determinant answer to questions nor covers all conceivable situations. 
This is the principle of indeterminacy.") 
I d. 
64See id. Trubek states that: 
[T]he critics reject the view that the doctrine contains a single, coherent, and justifiable 
view of human relations; rather, they see the doctrine as reflecting two or even more 
different and often competing views, no one of which is either coherent or pervasive 
enough to be called dominant. This is the principle of contradiction. 
65 See id. at 609 ("[T]here is no real world which is mirrored ... in legal ideas. Ideas and 
economic or social structures are mutually constituting. Law creates society and society creates law; 
the relationships are complex and multidirectional. The resulting systems of action and order must 
be seen as a totality."). For a foundational text regarding the "social construction" thesis, see PETER 
L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY ( 1966). See generally 
Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAw & Soc 'y REV. 1243, 
1248 (1994) (noting that legal thought creates fiction by transfonning the fluid and contested into 
"static and fixed"). 
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studies66 and the praxis of transforrnative politics.67 A passage from Robert 
Gordon's statement of the theoretical underpinnings of Critical Legal Studies is 
instructive: 
Positivist social scientists (who would include both liberal and Marxist 
"instrumentalist" legal theorists) are always trying to find out how 
social reality objectively works, the secret laws that govern its action; 
they ask such questions as, "Under what economic conditions is one 
likely to obtain formal legal rules?" Anti-positivists assert that such 
questions are meaningless, since what we experience as "social reality" 
is something that we are constantly constructing; and that this is just as 
true for "economic conditions" as it is for "legal rules."68 
· Note the two steps in the Critical position: (1) Crits interpret variation in doctrinal 
content as evidence of the claim that social reality is always in the process of 
being constructed, and (2) Crits conclude that there are no laws that govern that 
process of social construction.69 
This Article accepts the first step and rejects the second: reality is 
constructed, 70 but the process of that construction is observable and describable. 
We can make statements about the social construction process, and those 
statements can be more or less right or wrong. I want to suggest that the process 
of social construction by which a legal system is constantly being made, un-made, 
and re-made does in fact exhibit observable patterns patterns about which we 
66See William H. Clune III, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the 
Model for Public Policy, Research, and the Changing Roles of Law and Lawyers, 69 low A L. REv. 
47,103 n.l52 (1983). 
67Trubek & Esser, Critical Empiricism, supra note 62, at 45 (calling for "politically self-
conscious practice of knowledge construction"). 
68Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 281, 287 
(David Kairys ed., 1982). 
6~ote that Crits do observe some patterns in the social construction process, e.g., biases of 
individual decision makers on questions of class or race. In the vernacular of this Article, such 
biases are forms that enter the relevant system, and perhaps rise to the level of norms. The tendency 
to class bias is a form (and perhaps a norm) in precisely the same way as a discounted cash flow 
model. See infra Part V.A.2.(b ). My position is that social science can measure, and falsify 
hypotheses regarding, such fonns. 
70There is a parallel to the position that "social reality is socially constructed." See generally 
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KlND OF SCIENCE 1-16 (2002) (supporting proposition that the universe 
is computational, i.e., physical reality is physically constructed). Wolfram makes a substantial, even 
stunning, contribution to the reality is constructed thesis by suggesting the equivalence of all 
universal computing systems: e.g., the complex physical phenomenon being observed (e.g., a 
waterfall) is as complex as the researcher observing it. Object and subject are equally complex and 
mutually influential, and this is true even at the level of physics. /d . 
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can hypothesize and which hypotheses we can test and refine.71 Thus, my position 
differs substantially from the Critical position. Crits treat indetertninacy as the end 
of one inquiry ("What is a legal system? Nothing more than the execution of the 
biases of the most powerful actors.") and the beginning of another ("If that is all 
there is to a legal system, then let us turn our attention to policy studies and 
transformative politics."). I regard indeterrninacy as contributing substantial 
information and direction to the principal inquiry: What is a legal system? Can we 
specify its dynamics? 
3. A different direction: variation and emergence 
Suppose we take indeterminacy and contradiction, not as the end of the 
analysis, but rather as the beginning. 72 Instead of asking, "What does variation tell 
71It does not follow that, if one accepts the premise that reality is socially constructed, one 
must reject the possibility that stable, describable, and knowable patterns characterize the process 
of construction. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Scholars, Judges, and Phenomenology: Comments on 
Tamanaha's Realistic Sociolegal Theory, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 241, 242 (2000) (proclaiming himself 
"entirely persuaded by the Continental critique of positivism" and then going on to restate a theory 
of adjudication that draws from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology). The fonnulation 
provided by Trubek and Esser is helpful here. See Trubek & Esser, Critical Empiricism, supra note 
62, at II. Trubek and Esser define "universal scientism" (sometimes also called "positivism") as 
"an understanding of the nature of knowledge and its construction. It presupposes a radical 
distinction between an external world of objects and behaviors and an internal world of 
consciousness." /d. Trubek and Esser define "detenninism" as "an understanding of the social 
world. It suggests that social action is governed by laws, much like the laws that govern the rotation 
of the planets. These laws exist irrespective of our wills and provide social action with a deep 
logic." /d. Since I argue that there is a measurable and definable relationship between variation and 
ordering, my position ( 1) joins the Critical position in rejecting universal scientism 's split between 
object and subject I accept the claim that social reality is constructed; however, my argument (2) 
does not join the Crits' rejection of determinism. Socially constructed phenomena can exhibit 
observable patterns (although these patterns, by definition, do not exist "irrespective of our wills," 
and are probably rather unlike "the laws that govern the rotation of the planets"). See id. While we 
cannot predict the future content of a legal system, we can describe the dynamics and structures that 
generate that content. Indeed, it is a hallmark feature of self-organizing criticality that we can 
describe the structure that produces the content, but we cannot predict the content. See, e.g., J .C. 
Sprott et al., Self-Organized Criticality in Forest-Landscape Evolution, 297 PHYSICS LETTERS 267, 
267 (2002) (describing self-organized criticality emergence in simple models). 
72Speaking for the school of"autopoiesis," Gunther Teubner has written in a similar vein: 
While postmodemists are obviously satisfied to deconstruct legal doctrine and are 
joyfully playing with antinomies and paradoxes, legal autopoiesis poses the somewhat 
sobering question: After the deconstruction? 
Creative use of paradox is the message that moves autopoiesis beyond 
deconstructive analysis into reconstructive practice. It is the experience of real life, the 
experience that discursive practices "know" how to overcome the blockage of 
paradoxes and antinomies that does not allow autopoiesis theory to remain in the 
comforting twilight . . . . Paradoxes, tautologies, contradictions, and ambiguities in 
discursive practice are not the end of autopoietic analysis; they are seen as the starting 
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us about the content of a legal system?" let us ask, "What does variation tell us 
about legal systems' structure and dynamics?" How can a system characterized 
by variation be understood as a system73 at all? I want to suggest that content 
variation is a precondition for a dynamical process of emergence, in which legal 
systems develop and disseminate new features in a self-organizing process. 
In a classic study of the self-organizing of bureaucracies published in 1955, 
Peter Blau summarized his findings: 
In his analysis of bureaucratic structure, Weber focused upon official 
regulations and requirements and their significance for administrative 
efficiency. Of course, he knew that the behavior of members of an 
organization does not precisely correspond to its blueprint. But he was 
not concerned with this problem and did not investigate systematically 
the way in which operations actually are carried out. Consequently, his 
analysis ignored the fact that, in the course of operations, new elements 
arise in the structure which influence subsequent operations. Recent 
students of organization hav-e emp,hasized the importance of these 
emergent factors, such as informal relationships or unofficial norms .... 
. . ~ Most discussions on the subject contrast informal relationships 
and practices with the formal blueprint of the organization. This 
emphasizes the least interesting aspect of the concept of "informal 
organization,"namely, that behavior and relationships often fail to 
conform exactly to formal prescriptions, which is certainly not a novel 
discovery. Much more significant is the insight that such a~tivities and 
interactions are not simply idiosyncratic deviations but form consistent 
patterns that are new elements of the organization .... [O]rganizations 
do not statically remain as they had been conceived but always develop 
into new fortns of organization. 74 
Indetenninacy in doctrine and gaps between the blueprint and the reality are not 
just negative findings: things are up for grabs; you never can tell; "it's conflict all 
the way down."75 Rather, variation, be it indeterminacy, contradiction, paradox, 
point, as the very foundation of self-organizing social practices. 
Gunther Teubner, The TwoFacesofJanus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZOL.REv.l443, 
1444 45 (1992). 
73David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society 
Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1990) (describing "systemicity"). 
74PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY 2 ( 1955). See also CHESTER I. 
BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 114-22 (15th prtg. 1962) (discussing informal 
organizations). 
75 See Richard Michael Fischl, It's Conflict All the Way Down, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 773, 780 
(200 1 ). 
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or gap, is actually the beginning of a constructive finding: these indeterminacies 
and gaps contribute to the emergence of" consistent patterns that are new elements 
of the organization."76 Thus the insight of self-organization: alongside the static 
order rationally ordained (in the bankruptcy example, this is the pyramid story of 
appellate control and consolidation of doctrine), there is an order that is always 
emerging dynamically. Any accurate description of a legal system should account 
for both orders~ 
B. Structure in the Storm: Local Legal Cultures 
Variation in legal systems is normal and common. This observation turns on 
its head the claim (implicit in the pyramid story) that variation is aritithetical to the 
very definition of a legal system. To the contrary, a legal system as lived and 
experienced will live and experience variation. 
Yet it is not enough to say merely that variation is common. Variation is 
more than just a feature of legal systems; it is a structural feature. Variation is not 
noise in the system random, unpattemable, emitting scattered signals that 
ultimately cancel out each other. Rather, variation in a legal system's content is 
architectural it is generative of order. 
To take a closer look at the structural characteristics of variation, we begin 
by reviewing important empirical research, both in and beyond bankruptcy, on 
local legal cultures. 
76BLAU, supra note 74, at 2. The field of''sociolinguistics" provides substantial direction and 
• 
methodology to our study of the relationship between variable content and emergent norn1s. See, 
e.g., Uriel Weinrich etal.,EmpiricalFoundationsfora TheoryofLanguage Change, in DIRECTIONS 
FOR HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS: A SYMPOSIUM 95, 10~01 (W.P. Lehmann & Yakov Malkiel eds., 
1968). The authors note that: 
The facts of heterogeneity have not so far jibed well with the structural approach to 
language .... For the more linguists became impressed with the existence of structure 
of language, and the more they bolstered this observation with deductive arguments 
about the functional advantages of structure, the more mysterious became the transition 
of a language from state to state. After all, if a language has to be structured in order to 
function efficiently, how do people continue to talk while the language changes, that 
is, while it passes through periods of lessened systematicity? ... The solution, we will 
argue, lies in the direction of breaking down the identification of structuredness with 
homogeneity. The key to a rational conception of language change indeed, of 
language itself is the possibility of describing orderly differentiation in a language 
serving a community .... One of the corollaries of our approach is that in a language 
serving a complex (i.e., real) community, it is absence of structured heterogeneity that 
would be dysfunctional 
/d. (first emphasis added). As in language, the task of law should be to "break(] down the 
identification of structuredness with homogeneity" and instead discern the strocture in the variation, 
and state the relationship between that structure and the dynamics ofordering. /d. See also Galanter, 
Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 258 (looking to linguistic models for methodology useful to legal 
studies). 
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1. Local legal cultures in bankruptcy 
. . 
Empirical research on bankruptcy begins by observing substantial variation 
in the application of bankruptcy laws. 77 But the empirical work goes beyond 
merely observing the fact of variation: the research also establishes that this 
variation takes the form of substantial and persistent patterns. 78 These patterns can 
be organized geographically79 or non-geographically.80 Where the doctrinal 
literature contends that variation signifies a legal system that is fundamentally 
incoherent and at odds with itself, 81 the empirical research reveals something very 
different: the U.S. bankruptcy system is made up of many communities that are, 
in themselves, internally coherent and unified. The_se communities order and 
consolidate doctrine on a /ocailevel.82 The empirical work uses the tertn "local 
legal cultures'' to describe this organizational feature of variation. As defined by 
Professors Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L., Westbrook, local 
legal cultures are 
77 See infra text accompanying notes 82---85 (discussing empirical works). A devotee of the 
pyramid story would note that this variation blatantly defies the unifonn federal Bankruptcy Code 
and even goes so far as to violate the spirit ofa clause in the U.S. Constitution expressly authorizing 
Congress to "establish ... unifonn Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
78 See, e.g., LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 43, at 1502 (presenting "evidence 
of persistent, systematic differences in legal outcomes between communities governed by the same 
written law"). 
79See, e.g., Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 829 (using Western District of 
Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) and Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) as examples of 
percentage of Chapter 13 cases that are filed). See also TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 343 ( 1989) (noting that 
best level of analysis for bankruptcy variation is federal district rather than state). Federal districts 
may be better than states as levels of analysis because bankruptcy trial networks are organized 
district-by-district (and really, judge-by-judge). See infra Part V.A.l (discussing bankruptcy trial 
networks). 
80See infra note 93 (discussing Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over 
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large~. Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. 
L. REv. 125 ( 1990) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining]). 
81See supra Part III.A.l (discussing mainstream scholarly approaches to variation). 
82The term local does not necessarily correlate with geography. Actors share a local legal 
culture when they are networked with each other when they share a substantial amount of 
connections. See generally ALBERT -LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 
passim (2002) (detailing various links); MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE 
GROUND BREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 197 (2002) (noting that uthere can be no more than a few 
links separating any two individuals"). Networks can be defined by geography (e.g., folks in the 
Western District ofWisconsin form a practice community thatdiffers substantially from the practice 
community fonned in the Eastern District of Wisconsin) or by some non-geographical variable, 
such as status, see infra note 93 (describing non-geographic networks in LoPucki and Whitford 
study of variation in distributions by Chapter 11 plans). 
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systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a 
consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared by 
many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in 
identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and expectations 
existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal legal 
regime.83 
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These patterns of local ordering are remarkably robust, lasting over twenty years 
and weathering every sort of economic swing and several legislative adjustments 
to the Bankruptcy Code. 84 
Two examples of local legal cultures, one drawn from the consumer 
hemisphere of bankruptcy and one from the business hemisphere, provide a taste 
of the insight. 85 
(a) Repaymentfloors in Chapter 13 plans 
In the consumer hemisphere of bankruptcy, Professor Jean Braucher studied 
Chapter 13 plans routinely confirmed in bankruptcy jurisdictions in four 
metropolitan areas.86 Chapter 13 is a bankruptcy provision whereby a consumer 
debtor writes a plan that, among other things, may allow her to repay only a 
percentage of her original debt to some of her creditors. This plan is typically 
submitted to a Chapter 13 trustee who can play a substantial role in revising the 
plan. Ultimately, the plan must be confirtned by the judge of the local bankruptcy 
court. Braucher found that "repayment floors," i.e., minimum repayment 
percentages routinely accepted by trustees and confirmed by judges (and hence, 
routinely offered by local bankruptcy practitioners), had emerged along 
geographical pattems.87 For example, Braucher found that plans proposing to 
repay a mere ten percent of debt were routinely confirmed in Dayton, Ohio, while 
plans in San Antonio, Texas, needed to propose a hundred percent repayment in 
order to be routinely confirmed. 88 
83Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 804. 
84See id. at 858 (noting that "the differences suggested by the data are large enough and 
persistent enough to suggest systematic, community differences that survive the tenure of a single 
actor or group of actors"); Whitford, supra note 43, at 407-09. · 
85More examples of local legal strategies, usages, and nonns are collected infra Part V .A.2. 
See also LoPucki, Law in Lawyers ' Heads, supra note 43, at 1506-07 (noting variation in routinely 
passed floor levels in four U.S. cities). 
86Braucher, supra note 43 , at 532. 
87/d. 
88/d. 
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(b) Distributions to old equity in Chapter 11 plans 
In the business hemisphere of bankruptcy, Professors Lynn M. LoPucki and 
William C. Whitford studied the conduct of Chapter 11 reorganizations of the 
largest publicly held corporations over several years. 89 Chapter 11 plans, like their 
consumer counterpart, allow the debtor-corporation to write a plan that 
restructures debt and proposes a post-reorganization distribution of value. 
LoPucki and Whitford found that plans negotiated among the debtor-corporation 
and the various claimants against the firm very often included some distribution 
of value to the shareholders of the debtor-corporation prior to reorganization 
(these pre-bankruptcy shareholders are known as "old equity").90 These 
distributions routinely occurred despite a legal provision entitling creditors to 
absolute priority over old equity. This legal entitlement is clear and, according to 
LoPucki and Whitford, could be easily and cheaply enforced. 91 And yet creditors, 
against their apparent self-interest, routinely agreed to a distribution of value to 
old equity.92 LoPucki and Whitford conclude that the lawyers who negotiate the 
plans in big business bankruptcies are nearly all members of the same practice 
conununity (i.e., big city, mega-firtn lawyers), and that a convention of 
distribution to old equity had emerged within this community.93 
2. Local legal cultures beyond bankruptcy 
Long before empirical research by lawyers began sketching the outlines of 
bankruptcy's local legal cultures, social scientists researching legal systems had 
already made much use of the concept. An important early work suggesting the 
existence of local legal cultures was Herbert Jacob's Debtors in Court, published 
in 1969.94 Jacob surveyed creditors' debt collection practices and consumer 
debtors' bankruptcy filing rates in four Wisconsin cities. All four cities applied 
89LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining, supra note 80, at 134-3 7. 
90/d. at 143. 
91/d. at 144. 
92/d. 
93 !d. at 156-58. The 1990 findings (i.e., that there is substantial distribution to old equity) 
were supported in a more recent study of Chapter 11 bankruptcies from 1991 through 1996. See 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, UCLA School of Law, 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 3-11, at http://ssm.com/abstract=401160 (Apr. 29, 2003). It 
should be noted that distributions to old equity are certainly not prohibited by the Code, and were 
even explicitly envisioned by Congress. Nevertheless, the text of the statute does not compel, and 
the self-interest of creditors argues against, such distributions. The fact that big bankruptcy plans 
have developed singular characteristics suggests the existence of a legal culture that is hinged, not 
on geography, but on a sort of class or status: a community of interpretation and mutual-influence 
has emerged among the bankruptcy practitioners of large and prestigious law firms, whether those 
finns be in New York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco, or Los Angeles. 
94See HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT 87-96 (1969). 
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the same formal law (i.e., Wisconsin debt collection law and federal bankruptcy 
law).95 Yet Jacob's data showed both (1) substantial variation in the frequency of 
legal action (i.e., how often a creditor garnished a debtor's wages; how often a 
debtor sought bankruptcy protection); and (2) clear patterns in the variation 
demonstrating a significant correlation between parties' use of remedies and the 
city in which the action took place.96 A year later, Richard J. Richardson and 
• 
Kenneth N. Vines published a book in which they coined the tertn ''legal 
subculture" to explain the relationship between local political cultures and judicial 
recruitment to federal district courts.97 During the ensuing thirty years, a steady 
stream of social science research explored the usefulness of the local legal 
cultures explanation for various phenomena observed in civil and criminal _legal 
systems.98 
A 1978 report on court delay written by Thomas Church and his colleagues 
offers an early definition of "local legal cultures": 
95/d. at 88. 
96/d. at 89-91. 
91See RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS: 
LOWER COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 passim ( 1970). 
98See THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., EXAMINING LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE: PRACTITIONER 
ATTITUDES IN FOUR CRIMINAL COURTS 52 ( 1982) [hereinafter CHURCH, LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE] 
(discussing felony criminal dispositions in four cities); THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., ET AL., JUSTICE 
DELA YEO: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 54 ( 1978) (coining term "local legal 
culture'~ in study of pace of civil and criminal litigation in twenty-one urban courts); JAMES 
EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL 
COURTS 65-168 (University Press of America, Inc. 1991) (describing criminal felony dispositions 
in three cities); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 1--4 (1978) (noting newly recruited judges and attorneys adapt 
to extant nonns); JACOB, supra note 94, at 87-96 (describing inter-city variation in garnishments 
and bankruptcies); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE: REFORM IMPACT IN 
THE CRIMINAL COURTS 27-29 (1978) (detailing local variation in criminal courts); RICHARDSON & 
VINES, supra note 97, at 56-79 (noting connection between judicial recruitment and local political 
culture); Thomas W. Church, Plea Bargaining and Local Legal Culture, in CONTEMPLATING 
COURTS, 132, 138-39 (Lee Epstein ed. 1995) [hereinafter Church, Plea Bargaining] (discussing 
plea bargaining in four urban criminal courts); James L . Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the 
Behavior of Judges: A Representational Model of Judicial Decision Making, 14 LAw & Soc'y REv. 
343, 343--44 (1980) (discussing judges' role orientations); James L. Gibson, Judges' Role 
Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 911, 914-15 
(1978) (describing judges' role orientations); Joel B. Grossman et al., Measuring the Pace of Civil 
Litigation in Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 112 (1981) (discussing rate of 
processing civil litigation); Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and 
the Control of Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'y REV. 535, 537- 39 (1993) (describing Rule 11 
application in federal district courts); Raymond T. Nimmer, A Slightly Moveable Object: A Case 
Study in Judicial Reform in the Criminal Justice Process The Onmibus Hearing, 48 DENVER L.J. 
179, 187 ( 1971) (describing "local discretionary systems" in application of criminal plea 
bargaining). 
' 
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It is our conclusion that the speed of disposition of civil and criminal 
litigation in a court cannot be ascribed in any simple sense to the length 
of its backlog, any more than it can be explained by court size, case load, 
or trial rate. Rather, both quantitative and qualitative data generated in 
this research strongly suggest that both speed and backlog are 
determined in large part by established expectations, practices, and 
informal rules of behavior of judges and attorneys. For want of a better 
tertn, we have called this cluster of related factors the "local legal 
culture. "99 
This .. definition, like the definition of "local legal cultures" offered in the 
bankruptcy literature,100 focuses on the norms (including expectations, usages, 
perceptions, etc.) of network actors (including judges, practitioners, clients, etc.). 
I want to draw two points from the stream of social science research on local 
legal cultures. The first regards the construction of social reality associated with 
Critical Legal Studies and other traditions. 101 Church, in the 1978 passage just 
quoted, regards the objective factors surrounding delay (e.g., court size, case load, 
trial rate) as conceptually subsequent to subjective factors (i.e., the expectations 
of the relevant actors). 102 Other research suggests that the objective factors are 
conceptually prior to subjective factors. 103 Church, in a 1995 writing, elaborates 
on this "chicken-and-egg" problem: 
[D]oes local legal culture cause or at least influence a court's output and 
its practitioner's behavior? Or does cause and effect work the other way 
around? Are existing patterns of output and behavior simply 
internalized by new judges and lawyers when they "learn the ropes" in 
a court, and thereby unconsciously turned into nortns of behavior? 
Unfortunately, even if we establish a demonstrable relationship between 
actual court output and the norms of practitioners working in that court, 
it would not be possible to detertnine which of these two alternative 
99CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELA YEO, supra note 98, at 54. See also Church, Plea Bargaining, 
supra note 98, at 136-37. Church states that: 
/d. 
Indeed, when lawyers are called on to represent a client in an unfamiliar court, they 
often report that their biggest problems occur ,in areas of court operation that cannot be 
uncovered by reading statutes or local court rules or by looking at case files. Lawyers 
refer to these variations in norms and ways of doing things as differences in 'local 
practice.' Social scientists frequently use the term local/ega/ culture to describe this 
network of unwritten standards and patterns of behavior. 
100See Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 804. 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 65-71. 
102See CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 98, at 54. 
103Notably, Herbert Kritzer's Rule 11 study. See Kritzer & Zemans, supra note 98, at 539. 
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hypotheses is correct. The best that social science can usually provide 
is evidence of a relationship between two variables in this case, 
between practitioner notms and court system behavior. Detertnining 
which variable is the causal factor and which is what social scientists 
call the dependent variable is often a speculative exercise. 104 
515 
If the social construction thesis is correct, however, it is unnecessary to show that 
either objective or subjective factors are conceptually prior or causal subjective 
and objective factors mutually constitute each other. 105 
A second contribution of the social science literature is to help refine the 
definition of local legal cultures. It is the beginning of definition to say that local 
legal cultures involve the norms of network actors. But what are norms and what 
are networks? Let us clarify the meaning of these two key terms. 
C. Forms, Norms, and Networks 
It is useful to draw a distinction between norms andforms. In any given 
system, a form is just a particular way of doing things. Fortns in a legal system 
include at least the variety of lawyers' strategies, administrative routines, and 
judicial utterances. Broadly speaking, forms are everything that makes up the 
content of a system. 
A norm, on the other hand, is a particular forrn that has come to characterize 
system content. A norm is a way of doing things that has achieved a level of 
popularity or pervasiveness such that it has come to be expected.106 
104Church, Plea Bargaining, supra note 98, at 137. 
105 See id. ("It is entirely possible for causality to work in both directions: nonns can influence 
behavior, which in tum can influence nonns. The hypothesis suggested here is simply that 
practitioner notms regarding the proper mode of disposition of criminal cases are related to actual 
dispositional patterns in criminal trial courts."). See generally ARTHUR F. McEvoY, THE 
FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980 (1986); 
Hendrik Hartog, The End(s) of Critical Empiricism, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 53, 58 (1989) (asserting, 
for the purposes of argument, the "irrelevance of method"). 
1061t may be useful to illustrate the difference between fonns and nonns by using simple 
algebraic notation. Let us define variable system content as: 
_ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8. 9 10 n 
(J Cc - J.l ' J.l ' J.l. ' jJ ' J.l ' J.l ' J.l ' J..l ' /J ' jJ ' · · • J.l 
where u stands for variation, Ec stands for system content, and each jJ represents a different 
particular fonn. For example the p's in the above statement could represent the variety of ways that 
a judge could assign value to a car, with p,' being "look it up in the bluebook," 1-l being "evidence 
from a local appraiser," p 3 being "owner testimony" and so forth. Let us define ordered system 
content as: 
"' _ I I 1 I 2 I 1 1 I I 1 
'P Cc - jJ ' jJ 'jJ ' f.J ' jJ ' /J ' /J 'jJ ' f.J ' J..l ' • • · jJ 
where l/J represents a norm of the system's content. In this latter statement we see that J.l1 (look it 
up in the bluebook) has come to characterize the system. While there is still the occasionaltl 
(evidence from local appraiser), we can say that the system has come to expect bluebook evidence 
516 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2004: 483 
Networks can be a slippery concept. 107 The social science literature on local 
legal cultures has set forth at least two rival conceptions of networks; each is 
discussed below. 
1. Networks as Hworkgroups" 
In 1977, James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob published their study of 
criminal felony dispositions in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit.108 The authors 
found that where the same judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorney 
worked together on multiple cases, plea bargains increased and cases were 
disposed more quickly.109 Where the membership of the workgroup (i.e., judge, 
prosecutor, defense attorney) was unstable, there were fewer plea bargains and a 
slower disposition rate. 110 Eisenstein and Jacob conclude: "Familiarity produced 
pleas, because with familiarity negotiations reduced uncertainty."111 
A workgroup, as used by Eisenstein and Jacob, is a set of system actors that 
are strongly tied to each other112 that is, a workgroup is comprised of actors who 
are common participants in repeated transactions. The question is whether a 
network, properly defined, should be limited to the strongly tied actors of a 
workgroup, or whether a network includes workgroups plus something more. 
Undoubtedly, strongly tied actors establish communicative norms. We 
observe, for example, that frequent conversation partners develop a special slang, 
and autistic twins develop their own language. But, while a strong-ties-workgroup 
definition of networks seems accurate, it also seems underinclusive. The problem 
with limiting the definition of networks to strong-ties groups is the suggestion of 
autonomy: if networks were no more than isolated workgroups, operating side-by-
side as separate and sealed systems, then communication between networks would 
be. much more difficult than it is. Each workgroup would comprise its own 
system, and the ordering of that system's content would be autonomous, with no 
(i.e., bluebook evidence is the norn1). So a norm is nothing more than a particular form that has 
come to characterize a system. More generally, we can say that the project of this Article is to state 
the relationship between variable system content (a Ec) and ordered system content(¢ Ec). 
107See infra Part IV.C.l for my attempt to refine the definition of network. 
108EISENSTEIN & JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE, supra note 98, at 67- 178. 
109 /d. at 244-51. 
110/d. 
111Jd. at 252. 
112 See generally Mark S. Granovettor, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. OF Soc. 1360, 
1360, 1362-63 (1973) [hereinafter Granovettor, Strength of Weak Ties] (arguing that "the degree 
of overlap of two individuals' friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to 
one another"); MarkS. Granovettor, The Strength ofWeak Ties: A Network Theory Revis ted, 1 Soc. 
THEORY 201,202 (1983) [hereinafter Granovettor, Weak Ties Revisited] (noting "that social systems 
lacking in weak ties will be fragmented and incoherent"). 
• 
' 
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possibility for inter-workgroup ordering. A broader definition of networks seems 
necessary. 
2. Networks as semi-autonomous 
Church, in a 1982 study of criminal court practices in Pittsburgh, Miami, 
Detroit, and the Bronx, explicitly challenged the workgroup hypothesis presented 
by Eisenstein and Jacob. 113 The workgroup hypothesis suggests that where 
workgroup stability is high, the trial rate will be low because the familiarity of the 
parties with one another will facilitate disposition by plea bargaining; similarly, 
where workgroup stability is low, the hypothesis suggests that the parties' lack of 
familiarity with each other will impede plea bargaining and result in more full 
trials. 114 Contrary to the workgroup hypothesis, however, Church's data showed 
that the 
court with consistently the lowest proportion of trials ... [the Bronx] 
affords very little opportunity for the growth of stable relationships 
among judge, [assistant district attorney], and defense attorney. The one 
court with unambiguously strong workgroup cohesion Miami's felony 
court consistently ranks at or near the top in the proportion of cases 
disposed by triaL The relationships among the courts are thus almost the 
opposite of what the courtroom workgroup hypothesis would 
suggest . . . . . 
[T]hese observations ... suggest that dispositional practices in a 
court system may be grounded in something more fundamental and 
permanent than the current assignment practices and management 
procedures of courts, district attorneys, and public defenders.115 
Forms and norms, it seems, develop not only within workgroups, but also across 
workgroups. 116 So the proper definition of network should represent an 
overlapping and semi-autonomous arrangement of multiple workgroups. Church, 
writing in 1995, suggests that "[ o ]ne corollary of the legal culture hypothesis is 
the expectation of finding general agreement both within and across classes of 
practitioners in a given court. In other words, the notion of legal culture implies 
113CHURCH, LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE, supra note 98, at 48- 52. 
114/d. at 48-49. 
115 /d. at 52. 
11 6Put another way, the situs for ordered system content can be either intra-network or inter-
network. Much of the local/ega/ cultures research in bankruptcy may be evidence of intra-network 
ordering (i.e., "that's the way we do things here in the Western District of Wisconsin"), but self-
• organization also involves nornts that spread, via weak ties, from network to network. See infra Part 
V .A.2.(b) (examples of inter-network organizing). 
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shared norn1s within a jurisdiction, not simply differences across courts."1 17 
Properly understood, a network includes strong-ties workgroups, but also 
transcends them. 
D. From Variation to Ordering 
Local legal cultures constitute evidence of non-hierarchical ordering. Legal 
fonns, which would otherwise be variable, are systematized in a particular 
locality. We can thus conclude that at least some significant portion of the 
variation we observe is not random noise. Rather, there are patterns to the 
variation, and these patterns are stable, knowable, and navigable. This 
contribution of the local legal cultures research is quite significant: alongside 
hierarchical mechanisms, we also find means of self-organization that produce 
emergent patterns. 118 
But while local legal cultures show us the existence of non-hierarchical 
ordering, they do not show us how that ordering occurs. Local legal culture is an 
observation, not an explanation.119 
We thus return to the fundamental question: "What orders system content 
when hierarchy does not?" The example of bankruptcy has shown us a legal 
• 
117Church, Plea Bargaining, supra note 98, at 146. 
118Important work in the bankruptcy area by LoPucki substantially develops this informal and 
emergent model of legal ordering. LoPucki suggests that local practice communities construct 
"shared mental models" that serve as reservoirs of system content, and these models prove resilient, 
even to changes in the forn1al written law. See LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 43, at 
1501--02. LoPucki states that: 
Within [small practice] communities, the law in lawyers' heads plays a dominant role. 
A shared mental model of law implicitly proclaims ''this is how we do things" (or, if 
the conversation should skip to a higher plane, "this is the right thing to do") .... In 
these communities, the shared mental model is primary law, and the written law merely 
background with which the model interacts. 
/d. LoPucki then applies an economic model developed by economists Arthur T. Denzau and 
Douglas C. North as an alternative to the conventional substantive rationality optimization model. 
See Arthur T. Denzau & Douglas C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47 
KYKLOS 3, 18- 20 ( 1994). LoPucki 's analysis thus begins the process of specifying the dynamics 
of legal ordering. We can now say, following LoPucki, Denzau, and North, that the dynamics of 
legal ordering involves the process of developing and communicating shared mental models on the 
local level, i.e., systemdynamicsofchangeinvolves speakers' norms. This is an important advance. 
Yet we are still interested in how those models or expectations (forms, in the vernacular of this 
Article) are developed and communicated. 
!d. 
119See Grossman et al., supra note 98, at 112. The authors state that: 
'local legal culture' is not an explanation as much as it is a convenient restatement of 
the problem. It merely applies a label to what is generally accepted: that the practices 
and attitudes toward court processiqg of attorneys and court personnal [sic] play a 
significant role in determining the pace of litigation in a particular court. 
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system that, despite substantial defects in hierarchical mechanics, continues to 
manifest ordering via multiple local legal cultures. There seems to be 
substantially more ordering in the bankruptcy system than one would have a right 
to expect if the pyramid story alone was true. The fortnal mechanisms of 
hierarchy, which occupy the center stage of the legal imagination, explain some 
legal ordering, but not all. Hierarchy reigns, but does not rule. 120 
We can distill two features of local legal cultures: first, a structure of 
overlapping networks local legal cultures overlap in such a way that they are 
experienced, not as several sealed and separate systems operating side-by-side, 
but rather as a single and unified (but not uniform) whole. So we can say that the 
practice of bankruptcy law, like the practice of speaking English in the United 
States, exhibits nationwide conununicative unity with stark regional accents. 
Second, a dynamics of form innovation and norm emergence: local legal cultures 
generate forms and norms, which constitute a given local legal culture as both 
coherent in itself and distinct from other local legal cultures. 
These two features, structure and dynamics, frame our attempt to explain the 
process of non-hierarchical ordering. 
IV. SELF-ORGANIZATION 
What explains legal ordering? More specifically, what explains the ordering 
that is not explained by hierarchical mechanics? 
To clarify the process of non-hierarchical ordering, we must supplement the 
traditional image of the pyramid with a different image: overlapping networks that 
generate interpenetrating forms and nortns. This Part presents a self-organizing 
model of legal systems, with particular application to bankruptcy. First, I specify 
some organizational features of the bankruptcy law system. Next, noting again 
that hierarchical mechanics explain a good deal of the ordering we observe in 
bankruptcy, I will attempt to probe the limits of the hierarchical explanations. 
Finally, I attempt to construct a model of self-organization. Building on a diverse 
body of research in the physical and social sciences, I will describe (1) the 
structures of self-organization, and (2) the dynamics of interaction within and 
among those structures. 
120This turn of phrase was suggested to me by my colleague, Marc Galanter. 
• 
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A. Organizational Features of the Bankruptcy Legal System 
An organizational analysis 121 ofbankruptcy should begin with a listing of the 
relevant system players. Significant actors in the bankruptcy legal system include 
at least the following: 
Bench 
• the 326 bankruptcy courts122 (comprised of the bankruptcy judge and the 
personnel in his or her chambers, including administrative staff and 
judicial law clerks); 
• the clerk of each bankruptcy court (and his or her administrative staff); 
• the appellate courts (including the district courts of which bankruptcy 
courts are departments, the circuit courts of appeals, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and all the relevant judicial clerks and administrative staff); 
Trustees 
• the office of the U.S. Trustee and staff; 
• the individual trustees-in-bankruptcy (including standing trustees, 
specially appointed trustees, trustee-hired professionals such as 
accountants, appraisers, attorneys, and attendant administrative staffs); 
121There is, of course, a substantial social science literature performs organizational analyses 
of legal phenomena. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN & JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE, supra note 98, passim 
(discussing effect of workgroup development on various decisions in criminal courts); Grossman 
et al., supra note 98, at 91-93 (noting that legal nonns "play a significant role in determining the 
pace oflitigation"). In the legal literatures there is a growing call for "institutional analysis" of legal 
phenomena. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, at xi (1994) (noting centrality and importance of analysis of 
"institutional choice,'); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New 
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALEL.J. 1717, 1717 (2000) (suggesting institutional analysis 
of racial discrimination in judiciary); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of 
Discourse, and theMiQroanalysisoflnstitutions, 109 HARV. L.REv. 1393, 1393 (1996). Following 
Rubin, this Article presents a "microanalysis" of the institutions active in the bankruptcy legal 
system. See also Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as an 
Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265, 281 (1997) (book review) (noting need for "microanalysis" to 
understand actions of judiciary); Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: 
The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 903, 904 ( 1996) 
(book review) (discussing need for study of "interplay between fonnal rules and infonnal 
practices"). 
122Author's count as of October 2001. 
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Bar 
• attorneys, paralegals, expert witnesses (such as appraisers and financial 
modelers), and administrative staff; 
Consumers 
• clients (including repeat players such as organizations that frequently 
exercise debt-collection and other lender-related powers, and one-time 
players such as most consumer debtors); 
• other affected parties (e.g., employers ordered, via employer wage orders, 
to pay debtors' wages directly to a trustee); 
• near-clients (comprising those actors who have not consumed 
bankruptcy-related goods, but are connected to the system because they 
may someday be in a position to consume bankruptcy-related goods); 
• non-clients (including the social and business networks of clients); 
• the substantial apparatus surrounding Congress and the Executive, 
including lobbyists, donors, professional associations such as the 
American Bankruptcy Institute, the Commercial Law League of America, 
the National Bankruptcy Conference, etc.; 
Cottunentators 
• journalists and other organs of popularization, public opinion, and social 
communication; 
• scholars and academic actors. 
All of these system actors play a role in the ordering of system content. At 
the outset, I want to give special attention to the 326 bankruptcy courts. These 
courts are trial courts, fora of first instance, and their function differs in significant 
ways from the oft-studied appellate courts. 
Bankruptcy courts produce two significant out-products. 123 First, bankruptcy 
courts distribute the benefits and burdens of bankruptcy; they administer the 
1231n characterizing the 326 bankruptcy courts organizationally as producing certain products, 
I follow the pioneering work of Martin Shapiro. See Martin Shapiro, Decentralized Decision-
Making in the Law of Torts, in POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 44, 50 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1970) (describing tort organization as "fifty-two tops," comprised ofhighest 
court of each U.S. state system, highest court of U.S. federal system, and aggregation of British 
courts making tort rulings). 
• 
• 
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discharge and automatic stay, confirrn plans of reorganization that reconfigure 
contracts, oversee the distribution of the estate among creditors, and otherwise 
parcel out bankruptcy's benefits and costs. 
The second significant out-product of bankruptcy courts is doctrine. As an 
incident of executing their task of burden and benefit distribution, bankruptcy 
courts speak doctrine. Doctrine is what an organization officially proclaims and 
memorializes about what it is doing. These official proclamations and 
memorializations serve to orient the organization to its task, and also serve as 
communications media to actors inside and outside the organization. 124 Doctrine 
can be the mission statement posted on the wall of a local community center, the 
quarterly earnings projections announced by Microsoft, the official logging policy 
for federal lands in Montana established by the U.S. Forest Service, or the favored 
method for valuing a car announced by a bankruptcy court in Wisconsin. Doctrine 
provides important evidence both of what an organization thinks of itself, 125 and 
how outside parties understand and will relate to that organization. 
In addition to producing doctrine and distributing bankruptcy's benefits and 
burdens, bankruptcy courts also occupy an important strategic location in the 
greater bankruptcy system: bankruptcy courts, as fora of first instance, are points 
of access for extra-system actors (e.g., actors from business networks or consumer 
networks) to enter into the bankruptcy legal system. Trial courts are regarded as 
"low-status," vis-a-vis appellate courts, because of their proximity to and 
interaction with nonlegal actors. 126 But it is precisely this low-status position that 
locates trial courts as the best-placed receptors of fonns generated by networks 
beyond the legal system. 127 
124See infra text accompanying notes 156-64 (discussing Macaulay's description of variation 
in use of formal contracts). 
125See MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE 212 ( 1998) (describing process of creating doctrine in context of"phenomenology 
of institutional thought"). 
126 JACOB, supra note 94, at 129. Jacob asserts that: 
The political role of the judiciary has typically been seen to lie in the tendency of 
higher courts (especially the U.S. Supreme Court) to evolve new policies as significant 
as those developed by Congress or the President. Lower courts have little role in this 
policy-making function. But lower courts specialize in dealing with people in 
crisis .... [C]ourt appearances are not routine for most litigants. 
/d. See infra Part V .B (discussing relationship between low-status and innovation in process of legal 
change). 
127Sociolinguistic research has demonstrated that there is more variation in speech usage 
among communities of lower social status (e.g., the inner city) than among the higher status speech 
communities. See JAMES MILROY, LINGUISTIC VARIATION AND CHANGE: ON THE HISTORICAL 
SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF ENGLISH 96 ( 1992). Milroy states: 
It was clear ... [in] our Belfast work that to describe the inner-city phonology was a 
more complicated task than to describe 'middle-class' phonology, because there 
appeared to be much more variability within inner-city language than in higher status 
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B. Exhausting Hierarchical Explanations 
Explanations of ordering in bankruptcy properly begin with the obvious: 
hierarchy. Bankruptcy law is, after all, federal law, and there are substantial 
hierarchical mechanisms built into the bankruptcy system that are designed to 
order system content. Can we explain bankruptcy's ordering entirely from these 
blueprint features, without having to resort to the informal dynamics of adaptation 
and emergence that characterize self-organization? Before turning to a self-
organizing model, we should do our best to exhaust hierarchical explanations of 
ordering. 
Herbert Kaufman's classic organizational analysis of the U.S. Forest 
Service128 is useful as a model for the present organizational analysis of the U.S. 
bankruptcy system. Both Kaufman's project and mine want to explain the 
presence of ordering, the "unity without unifortnity" 129 that occurs in some 
organizations. Juxtaposing Kaufman's organizational analysis of the U.S. Forest 
Service to an organizational analysis of the bankruptcy system shows both the 
reach and the limits of purely hierarchical explanations of ordering. 
The plan of Kaufman's study was to identify an organization subject to 
powerful forces of fragmentation ("centrifugal forces" 130) and then to study the 
"techniques ofintegration"131 by which that organization maintained its unity and 
coherence. Kaufman chose as his subject organization the U.S. Forest Service. 
However, rather than study that organization top-down, beginning with its chief 
administrative and policymaking offices located in the Department of Agriculture 
in Washington, D.C., Kaufman instead looked to the organization's ground-level 
operatives, 132 selecting a sample of five "Ranger Districts" of the then extant 792 
language. . . . [T]he speech community can be envisaged as being shaped like a 
pyramid, with greater variability at the lower end and greater convergence (or relative 
unifonnity) at the upper end. 
!d. Analogizing this finding to the project of legal studies, we can hypothesize that trial networks 
(i.e., lower status groups) possess higher variation and more often serve as the source of legal 
innovations than appellate networks (i.e., higher status groups). See infra Part V.B (trial courts as 
possible primary agents in the process of legal change). 
128HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 
( 1960). 
129 /d. at 203 
130 /d. at 86, 204. 
131/d. at 89. 
132This was because 
[i]n public administration, it is all too common to look at agency organization from the 
top down. Organization charts and description start with the head, then go to the 
branches, and finally to the lower levels. There is discussion of such matters as 
delegation of authority and of control by the top. This is all important; but perhaps 
more significant is to look at the organization upwards from the lowest general purpose 
unit in this case, from the ranger district upward. This is what the present study has 
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districts charged with overseeing 181 million acres of federal lands scattered 
across the United States. 
Kaufman analyzed the centrifugal forces working against the unity and 
coherence of the organization (e.g., the tremendous physical/geographical distance 
between field agents; the significant local interests attempting to influence the 
rangers' administration of forest resources, etc.) and asserts that the Forest Service 
has remained, in spite of it all, relatively unified. 133 Kaufman then defined the 
"techniques of integration," those elements that militate against the fragmentation-
inducing centrifugal forces. 134 
Kaufman identifies three techniques of integration: ( 1) techniques for "pre-
forming" decisions, i.e., guiding the discretion of field officers; (2) techniques for 
monitoring field officers; and (3) techniques for selecting and training field 
officers.135 The first two are explicitly hierarchical. The third, while substantially 
hierarchical, begins to intimate a dynamics of emergence that points us in the 
direction of self-organization. 
1. Pre-forming decisions 
What Kaufman calls ''procedural devices for pre-fortning decisions"136 
consists mainly of a single written resource: the Forest Service Manual, a 
done. 
Marion Clawson, Foreword to KAUFMAN, supra note 128, at vii. 
133KAUFMAN, supra note 128, at 204: 
/d. 
[T]hree things appear too pronounced, particularly when compared with the private 
sector of the forest economy, to be the result of unco-ordinated actions of individual 
Rangers: the consistent, long-tenn connection between announced goals and actual 
perfotmance; the responsiveness of production to changes in leadership objectives; and 
the steady march of perfonnance records toward goals of the leaders .... Despite the 
centrifugal forces at work in national forest administration, the actual accomplishments 
of field units have been brought into agreement with the mission defined by the officials 
in central headquarters. 
134/d. at 89-91. 
135 /d. at 91, 13 7, 161. 
136/d. at 91. Kaufman states: 
Since it is clear that the organizations for national forest administration might 
disintegrate if each field officer made entirely independent decisions about the handling 
of his district, many decisions.are made for them in advance of specific situations 
requiring choice .... [E]vents and conditions in the field are anticipated as fully as 
possible, and courses of action to be taken for designated categories of such events and 
conditions are described. The field officers then need determine only into what category 
a particular circumstance falls; once this determination is made, he then simply follows 
the series of steps applicable to that category. Within each category, therefore, the 
decisions are "pre ... fonned." 
/d. (citation omitted). 
• 
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multivolume, 3000-plus-page set ofloose.leafbinders "put out by the Washington 
office of the Forest Service, which incorporates, explicates, and interprets the 
• 
relevant legal documents applicable to the agency.''137 The manual is 
supplemented by regional and local directives. 138 "From free ... use permits to huge 
sales of timber, from burning permits to fighting large fires, from requisitioning 
office supplies to maintaining discipline, classes of situations and patterns of 
response are detailed in the Manual. Every action is guided."139 
Bankruptcy also has its manual. In the world of bankruptcy practice the 
sections of the U.S~ Bankruptcy Code (along with the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure) are the predominant means of "pre-forming_" decisions. 
Like the Forest Service manual, the Code is the common text of the entire 
profession, and stands as authoritative. Unlike the Forest Service manual, the 
Code is not the product of an administrative agency. Because it is a federal statute, 
the words of the Code are revisited and revised by Congress only infrequently and 
at extremely high cost. And, as we have seen, it is relatively rare that the words 
of the Code are clarified via the construction of an authoritative appellate court. 
Moreover, there is much that the Code, even on its face, unavoidably leaves "up 
for grabs" in both the procedure and substance of bankruptcy law. 
2. Monitoring 
The second set of"integration techniques" identified by Kaufman are devices 
for "detecting and discouraging deviation."140 These include reports that field 
officers write at the request of the leadership and ''official diaries" kept by the 
rangers, assistant rangers, and their principal aides 
show[ing] to the nearest half-hour how each workday is spent. On 
standard [U.S. Forest] Service-wide forms, the field officers and 
employees record each thing they do, describing the activity in enough 
detail for any inspector to identify it, the functions to which the activity 
is chargeable, the time at which it began and was completed, and the 
amount of office, travel, and field time that it entailed. They thus 
compile a full running record of the way they employ their time. 141 
137 See id. at 95. 
138ld. at 97. 
139 I d. at 96. 
140 I d. at 126. 
141Jd. at 130--31. The comparison to the "every six minutes" billing records of a law finn is 
obvious . 
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These reports and diaries are regularly reviewed by higher-ups who then 
scold or praise as occasion sees fit. 142 Other means of monitoring field officers 
include: inspections by internal auditors; 143 appeals by private parties of field 
officers' decisions (e.g., the decision not to grant a grazing pertnit to a particular 
private livestock concern) to the officers' superiors; 144 frequent reassignment of 
field officers to other geographical regions within the Forest Service;145 and 
internal sanctions. 146 · 
Such monitoring of the "field officers" ofbankruptcy (i.e., the judges ofU.S. 
bankruptcy courts) is more difficult to measure. For a bankruptcy judge, the most 
natural form of being monitored by superiors is having your decisions subject to 
review and reversal by a higher court. As we have seen, the probability of 
meaningful review in any given case is statistically very low. Yet most bankruptcy 
judges are very sensitive to the possibility of review. To minimize the chances of 
reversal, many judges almost certainly adjust their behavior in infortnal ways that 
are difficult for an outside observer to measure or detect. 147 
. . 
Another significant means of monitoring bankruptcy judges is the 
reappointment process. Bankruptcy judges serve fourteen-year terms and are 
subject to reappointment by the relevant court of appeals, often considering the 
recommendation of the local bankruptcy bar. 148 The possibility of not being 
reappointed is likely to exert influen.ce on job perfonnance. 
3. Selection and training of personnel 
Kaufman's third set of "integration techniques" involves the selection and 
training of personnel . as Kaufman names it, "developing the will and capacity 
to conform"149'by first "selecting men who fit"150 and then fostering their loyalty 
142/d. at 131-34. 
143/d. at 137. 
144/d. at 153. 
145 /d. ·at 155-56. 
146/d. at 157. 
147In a valuation dispute, for example, a bankruptcy judge might tend to split the difference 
between the values argued for by the two parties as a way of diminishing the chances of appeal. 
148While reappointment is the nonnal course, the rare failure to be reappointed receives 
substantial attention among the bankruptcy bench and bar. See, e.g., Anne Colden, Pioneer 
Bankruptcy Judge Won't See Her Term Renewed, DENVER POST, Apr. 22, 2000, at Cl. Judge 
Patricia Ann Clark of the District of Colorado Bankruptcy Court was denied reappointment. 
''[A]ccording to some members of the Colorado Bar, ... Clark made some enemies during her years 
on the bench .... A subcommittee of the Colorado Bar Association solicited opinions about whether 
Clark should be reappointed." !d. See generally Bankruptcy's Reappointment Mess, 36 BANKR. CT. 
DECISIONS NEWS & COMMENT, Oct. 18, 2000, No. 18 (discussing shortcomings in existing 
bankruptcy judge reappointment process). 
149KAUFMAN, supra note 128, at 161. 
150/d. 
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to the Forest Service. He discusses the rites of recruiting and training, including 
the rigorous program of frequently relocating officers to a wide variety of posts 
all over the county, especially early in their careers. 151 
Bankruptcy also has its rites of selection and training. Bankruptcy judges are 
selected by the regional court of appeals, which often will rely upon a 
recommendation of the local bankruptcy bar, which has agreed to put forward one 
of its own. Bankruptcy judges are trained, first, as all lawyers are trained, through 
the reorientation of a law school education and the discipline of practice, and then, 
as bankruptcy judges, by their peers and by the members of the bar that appear 
before them. Additionally, the Federal Judicial Center operates annual training 
programs for all bankruptcy judges ("baby judges' school") and publishes 
resource manuals for use by the judges. Also, there are multiple professional 
associations and annual conferences that serve to cultivate the exchange of 
ideas. 152 
Kaufman concluded that the three "integration techniques" (i.e., pre-forming, 
monitoring, selection, and training) explain the unity and coherence he observed 
in the U.S. Forest Service. While that might have been a satisfactory conclusion 
in the case of the U.S. Forest Service in 1960, it is not at all clear that these 
integration techniques fully explain the ordering we observe in U.S. bankruptcy 
law. In that sense, Kaufman's project ends where the present project begins. 
Going beyond Kaufman's approach, we distinguish between the hierarchical 
mechanisms that he examined, and other, non-hierarchical, forces for integration. 
The first two of Kaufman's "integration techniques" are expressly hierarchical: 
the publication of texts, like the Forest Service manual, and the monitoring of 
inferior officers by their superiors both depend on the existence and successful 
deliberate implementation of a hierarchical chain-of-command. Kaufman's third 
technique, selection and training of personnel, is also presented as a sort of 
blueprint device, but with the intimation that there is something more dynamical 
and emergent going on. Kaufman leaves the dynamics of emergence substantially 
unexplored. 
This Article's description of the bankruptcy system will focus on the 
dynamics of emergence. I attempt this description not because I want to show a 
gap between blueprint and reality. 153 Rather, I want to prescind entirely from the 
151 /d. at 176. 
152National organizations include the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, the 
American Bankruptcy Institute, the Commercial Law League of America, the Turnaround 
Management Association, and the National Bankruptcy Conference. Additionally, there are 
specialized bar associations for bankruptcy professionals, organized by judicial district. 
153Which is, incidentally, like shooting fish in a barrel. We see gaps between our fonnal 
blueprints and the reality of legal systems just about every time we try, and we should learn from 
this only that our blueprints are biased and infirm. Since our biases generate our perception of the 
existence of gaps, the gap studies approach to scholarship may be something of an artificial 
exercise. See Galanter, Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 257 ("The perception of a 'gap' proceeds 
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blueprint perspective, and approach the task of description from a different, and 
hopefully unbiased, direction. 154 
C. A Self-Organizing Model 
This Section outlines a model of self-organizing legal systems. 155 Such a 
model should include: ( 1) a description of the structures; and (2) a description of 
the structures' dynamics (i.e., the way that self-organizing structures order system 
content via the innovation of forms and the emergence of norms). 
1. Self-organizing structures 
Stewart Macaulay's classic 1963 article on noncontractual relations among 
businesspeople156 is often cited for the proposition that formal contracts control 
only a small portion ofbusiness exchanges. That proposition, however, rests upon 
the substantial foundation of Macaulay's descriptive empirical research on dozens 
from and expresses an expectation of hannony or congruence between authoritative nonnative 
learning and patterns of action."). 
154Recall Blau's lapidary formulation: 
Most discussions [of emergence in organizations] contrast infonnal relationships and 
practices with the fonnal blueprint of the organization. This emphasizes ·the least 
interesting aspect of the concept of"informal organization," namely, that behavior and 
relationships often fail to confonn exactly to fonnal prescriptions, which is certainly 
not a novel discovery. Much more significant is the insight that such activities and 
interactions are not simply idiosyncratic deviations but forn1 consistent patterns that are 
new elements of the organization. . . . [O]rganizations do not statically remain as they 
had been conceived but always develop into new fonns of organization. 
BLAU, supra note 74, at 2-3. See also Abel, supra note 9, at 189. Abel states that: 
This continuing preoccupation with the gap problem has had unfortunate consequences 
for the development of a social theory of law. Scholarship is confined to a single 
question, seen from two perspectives: why does behavior deviate from law; why does 
law mandate a conformity which is not forthcoming? We are thus directed to particular 
gaps between law and behavior, and how we may close them. But ... we cannot 
entertain the possibility of another relationship between law and behavior, or begin the 
construction of a more complex model in which law and behavior interact without a 
one-to-one correspondence. 
/d. (citation omitted). 
155 A substantial amount of research in the physical sciences has been going forward under the 
general name of"self-organizing ctjticality :"For an introduction by one of the founding researchers 
in the field, see generally PER BAK, How NATURE WORKS 1 ( 1996) ("The aim of the science of self-
organized criticality is to yield insight into the fundamental question of why nature is complex, not 
simple, as the laws of physics imply."); see also Per Bak et al., Self-Organized Criticality, 38 
PHYSICAL REV. 364, 364 (1988) (discussing behavior of dynamical systems which organize 
naturally into critical state). 
156Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
Soc. REV. 55, 62 (1963). 
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of businesses in Wisconsin. It is the picture that Macaulay's research paints of 
these businesses that is most exciting and significant for the purposes of this 
Article. 
Macaulay asks the question: when are relations among businesspeople 
governed by formal norn1s (e.g. , contracts) and when by informal norrns (e.g., 
trust, tit-for-tat, 157 etc.)?158 Through the prism of that question, Macaulay develops 
a portrait of a business in action, which I have attempted to represent in Figure 4. 
. ; 
• • ;;..~!'!'· .~ ~ • 
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Compared with the clean, straight lines of the pyramids illustrated in the 
abstractions at Figures 1 and 2, Macaulay's picture of a business-as-experienced 
is something of an irregular, globby mess. Macaulay's schema portrays multiple 
overlapping communities generating different styles of regulation. I shall simplify 
by focusing on three of the communities that Macaulay describes: (1) the 
business' sales connnunity, which spends a substantial amount of time interacting 
with customers; (2) the business' production community, which spends a 
substantial amount of time interacting with other firtns that supply the materials 
needed for production; and (3) the groups in the business that deal with legal and 
compliance issues, record-keeping, and accounting, which spend lots of time 
trying to record and rein in the activities of the business' sales and production 
157Robert C. Ellickson' s book develops a model of "tit-for-tat" regulation. See ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167- 83 ( 1991 ). 
158Macaulay, supra note 156, at 56. 
• 
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communities. As represented in Figure 4, each of these groups overlaps with other 
relevant groups. 159 
As for the question of whether forrnal or informal norms control relations, 
Macaulay's work suggests that it depends on the relative occupational roles of the 
parties to the relationship! 60 Suppose the business is a newspaper. Folks on the 
production side will have relationships with suppliers of paper and ink, and those 
relationships will be practically governed by infonnal norms despite the presence 
of formal contracts. Likewise, the sales staff of the newspaper will have multiple 
informal and unrecorded arrangements with firms that buy advertising space in the 
newspaper. People in legal/compliance and accounting will labor mightily to 
record and control the activities of the people in sales and production. During 
times of ordinary business, sales and production will be at the center of the firm, 
with legal/compliance and accounting understood as controlling around the edges 
and at the margins. During extraordinary times (bad times from the business' 
perspective) such as audit time or lawsuit time, the people in legal/compliance and 
accounting move to the center, with sales and production temporarily reduced to 
a relatively subordinate position. 
Each community within the firtn develops its unique culture, manifested as 
much by the types of regulation that the conununity generates (i.e., formal, 
written, enforceable contracts or inforn1al arrangements of trust, courtesies, and 
reciprocation) 161 as by that community's special language and vernacular, habits, 
methods, and expectations. 162 Occupants of these overlapping communities 
develop mannerisms and methods for dealing with people in other communities. 
A salesperson will behave one way with a client, another way with a fellow 
salesperson, and a very different third way with someone from 
legal/compliance. 163 
159The figure could be filled in a bit more: "Inside" legal counsel for the business will overlap 
with communities of outside counsel, communities of government regulators, and communities of 
outside financial institutions. "Inside" accountants will likewise interact with "outside" regulators 
and financial professionals. "Inside" sales will overlap with "outside" advertising firms, etc. The 
figure should also include some representation of management that would be, to a greater or lesser 
extent, integrated with all or most of the other communities. 
160Macaulay, supra note 156, at 56. 
161 See id. at 66 (indicating that sales agents, who deal with customers, and productions 
officers, who deal with suppliers, are less inclined to make formal contracts, and more inclined to 
order via inforrnal norn1s ). 
162 Apropos is a Dilbert cartoon. As part of a firm-wide training program, employees are being 
temporarily relocated to other departments within the finn. Dilbert, a computer techie, is assigned 
to work in the sales department. He takes the elevator to the appropriate floor and alights into what 
seems to be a huge party. On the wall is a sign in flashing neon lights that says, "Sales 
Departrnent Three Drink Minimum." 
163 See Macaulay, supra note 156, at 68 (depicting sales and productions agents as "foreign 
affairs personnel" of business). Agents located at the intersecting points of communities, because 
of their unique ties both inside and outside the group, are best positioned to transport norms. See 
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Macaulay establishes that not only are formal contracts oftentimes altogether 
missing in the governance of business relations, but also that there is wide 
variation in how a contract, when present, is understood and used, and that this 
variation also corresponds to the occupational role or location of the party within 
a particular overlapping connnunity!64 So someone in h!gaVcompliance will 
regard a contract as a legally enforceable account of rights and responsibilities. 
Someone in production might see the same contract as a sort of list of what needs 
to be requisitioned and when. Finally, someone in sales might use the same 
contract as a convenient strategic fallback, allowing the salesperson to say to one 
client, "Gosh, I really can't go outside the contract," while simply ignoring the 
contract for a different client under different circumstances. 
Ten years after the publication of Macaulay's article, work by Sally Falk 
Moore165 contributed substantially to the two tasks we are concerned with here: 
the task of defining structures, and the task of specifying the structures' dynamics. 
F alk Moore's primary concern was methodological she wanted to state a method 
by which social scientists could frame particular subjects of study. Falk Moore 
called this task "field definition," using a term common in the physical sciences. 
A social field, 166 like a "natural field" or a "physical field," is defined functionally 
(not to say, tautologically) as that entity which is the focus of the scientific study. 
Where Macaulay had defined his fields (i.e., the Wisconsin businesses on which 
he had gathered data} implicitly, concretely and, as it were, a-theoretically, Falk 
Moore is interested in stating a general theory of the methodology of field 
defmition a generalizable way of looking that will clarify the process of selecting 
and defining specific social phenomena. 
For Falk Moore, fields are characteristically "semi-autonomous" and 
"processual." On the characteristic of semi-autonomy, Falk Moore writes: 
infra Part V .B (discussing role of low-status actors in process of legal change). 
164See Macaulay, supra note 156, at 55. Macaulay's finding that the variation in presence and 
use of contracts corresponds with the "occupational role" of the actor also corresponds with the 
notion that "low-status" actors (i.e., those who are weakly tied to actors in different networks) play 
a crucial role in transporting norms between fields. See generally JAMES MILROY, LINGUISTIC 
VARIATION AND CHANGE, at viii (1992) (exploring language change as social phenomenon); 
Granovettor, Strength of Weak Ties, supra note 112, at 1360 (arguing that interpersonal networks 
at micro-level translate into large-scale patterns which ultimately influence small groups); 
Granovettor, Weak Ties Revisted, supra note 112, at 203 (reviewing literature dealing with impacts 
of weak ties on individuals, sociological idea-flow, and social cohesion). 
165Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & Soc'YREv. 719,719 (1973). 
166The development of social fields as an approach to law is generally associated with the 
work of Bourdieu. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the 
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 814, 816 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987) ("The social practices 
of the law are in fact the product of the functioning of a 'field."' (citation omitted)). 
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The approach proposed here is that the small field observable to an 
anthropologist be chosen and studied in terms of its semi-
autonomy the fact that it can generate rules and customs and symbols 
internally, but that it is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other 
forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded. The 
semi-autonomous social field has rule-making capacities, and the means 
to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger 
social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the 
invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its own instance. 167 
These overlapping structures are further defined, Falk Moore maintains, less 
by what they are than by what they do. She continues, "[t]he semi-autonomous 
social field is defined and its boundaries identified not by its organization (it may 
be a corporate group, it may not) but by a processual characteristic, the fact that 
it can generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them."168 
In order to properly qualify as a social field, it is not necessary for a structure 
to possess any degree of institutionalization or specialization. It is enough that the 
structure "generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them."169 Imagine a 
spectrum of all social fields in which you have participated, ranging from social 
fields with high specialization and institutionalization to social fields with low 
specialization and institutionalization. Nearest to the high pole might appear 
fonnal and enduring legal systems such as the U.S. government. Proceeding down 
the spectrum, one. might encounter such entities as religious organizations and 
business associations. Nearing the low pole, one might locate the neighborhood, 
and then the occasional and thin ordinary networks (e.g., the barber who cuts your 
hair every few weeks or the merchant who sells you a cup of coffee every 
morning), and finally the group of four strangers who happened to ride in the 
elevator with you this morning while silently observing a certain etiquette (stand 
to the side; if your floor is coming up, announce this by moving to the front, and 
so forth). According to Falk Moore, these are all properly understood as social 
fields: each engages in self-regulation and each is subject to regulation by outside 
forces. 
Tracking Falk Moore's approach to field definition onto the representation 
of a business displayed in Figure 4, we see that there are at least six "semi-
autonomous social fields" denominated in the figure: (1) the finn, (2) the finn's 
legal/compliance and accounting departments, (3) the firm's production 
department, ( 4) the firtn' s sales department, ( 5) the firm's suppliers, and ( 6) the 
fim1's customers. Each. of these fields has the capacity, within its own group, to 
generate rules and coerce compliance with those rules, and each is subject to some 
167Falk Moore, supra note 165, at 720. 
168/d. at 722 (emphasis added). 
169 !d. 
• 
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outside regulation. Look closer at Figure 4, however, and several additional fields 
appear. For example, the point of intersection between sales and customers 
defines a separate field of interaction, in which unique norms and languages 
develop; similarly the point of intersection between sales and legal/compliance. 
Hence the processual feature of this method of field definition a field is defined 
not by an ex ante idealization or fortnal abstraction (such as an organizational 
flowchart depicting the firm with its various departments neatly arranged) but 
rather by what it does: ·generate and communicate forms. 
For the purposes of explicating the bankruptcy legal system, I offer two 
alterations to the task of field definition, again following on methodological 
advances associated with the physical sciences. First, I will not refer to fields but 
rather to networks. Networks are collections of connected elements. 110 In the social 
sciences such as legal studies, the elements are the actors (e.g.,judges, attorneys, 
paralegals, administrative assistants) and the connections are the relationships, or 
ties, that run between the actors. Networks, with its specification of elements and 
connections, may allow for more precision than fields in describing the 
interconnections of bankruptcy actors. Second, a useful way of representing 
networks is through the use of graphs, i.e., dots (the elements) drawn with lines 
of various sorts (the connections) running between the dots. "Graph th~ory" is an 
important area of study in mathematics. 171 
17<Network-based methodologies are becoming increasingly important as a basic research tool 
in the sciences. See generally BARABASI, supra note 82, at 7 ("This book has a simple aim: to get 
you to think networks. It is about how networks emerge, what they look like, and how they 
evolve."); BUCHANAN, supra note 82, at 22 ("Nexus focuses on a number of the world's most 
important networks .... ");STEVEN STROGATZ, SYNC: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SPONTANEOUS 
ORDER 1 (2003) (exploring· science of"spontaneous order in the universe"); DUNCAN J. W A TIS, SIX 
DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 16 (2003) ("[T]his book is ... a story about the 
science of networks."). 
171SeeGARYCHARTRAND,INTRODUCTORYGRAPHTHEORY,atvi{l985). Specifically, a graph 
is a set of vertices and edges (G = (V, E)). Each edge has an edge-weight, which is stated as a 
function. For the simplest graph, imagine two parties ("vertices") A and B, with the edge (A, B) 
' 
running between them, and the edge-weight for edge (A, B) = 1. Thus we have a mathematical 
description of a two-party, strong-ties, network. See id. at 10-19. Using this notation, we can 
elegantly and usefully describe very complex organizations. See also Kathleen M. Carley & 
Vanessa Hill, Structural Change and Learning Within Organizations, in DYNAMICS OF 
ORGANIZATIONS: COMPUTATIONAL MODELING AND ORGANIZATION THEORIES 63, 89-90 
(Alessandro Lomi & Erik R. Larsen eds., 200 I) (discussing computational modeling for network 
analysis). 
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Susan, Sales 
Fie:ure 5 
• 
----
Margie, representative 
for the Bingaman Account 
-
---
-
-
Tom, Sales Chuck, Sales 
To see the competitive advantage of network graphs over fields, consider 
Figure 5 as a specification of one detail represented in Figure 4. Nothing like the 
amorphous blobs represented in Figure 4 really exist. When you walk into the 
sales department of a business, you do not see a blob labeled "Sales" overlapping 
with a blob labeled "Customers." You see Chuck, a salesman, on the phone with 
Margie, who represents the Bingaman account. And not only does depicting 
networks with graphs allow for a higher degree of actor specification, it also 
allows us to specify the relationships between the actors we can see which 
actors are connected by strong ties (represented in Figure 5 by the solid lines 
connecting the three members of the sales staff), and which are connected by weak 
ties (shown in Figure 5 as the dotted line connecting Chuck· with Margie). 
Falk Moore also speaks to the variation in the types of "rules"172 that are 
generated by semi-autonomous structures. After laying out two empirical case 
studies (the operation of the better dress line in New York City's garment trade, 
and attempts to legislate social change in Tanzania) Falk Moore writes: 
These examples all involve at least two kinds of rules: rules that 
were consciously made by legislatures and courts and other formal 
agencies to produce certain intended effects, and rules that could be said 
to have evolved "spontaneously" out of social life. Rules of corporate 
organizations, whether they are the laws of a polity or the rules of an 
organization within it, frequently involve attempts to fix certain 
relationships by design. However, the ongoing competitions, 
172In the vernacular of this Article, Falk Moore's "rules" are fonns and potential norms. 
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collaborations and exchanges that take place in social life also generate 
their own regular relationships and rules and effective sanctions, 
without necessarily involving any such pre-designing. The ways in 
which state-enforceable law affects these processes are often 
exaggerated and the way in which law is affected by them is often 
underestimated. Some semi-autonomous social fields are quite 
enduring, some exist only briefly. Some are consciously constructed, 
such as committees, administrative departments, or other groups fortned 
to perfortn a particular task; while some evolve in the marketplace or 
the neighborhood or elsewhere out of a history of transactions. 173 
535 
Putting Falk Moore's argument into the vernacular of this Article, ordering 
of system content occurs through both hierarchic organization and self-
organization. Hierarchic explanations of ordering contend that order exists 
because hierarchically inferior actors execute the directives of their superiors. 
Alternatively, a self-organizing explanation describes a system with many 
generative centers rather than one, and with the flow of authority running outward 
from the various centers, rather than from the top downwards, as in a hierarchic 
model. 174 Unlike the hierarchic model, where the order sought is the product of 
some deliberately intended grand design or blueprint, spontaneous ordering yields 
a result that is the product of many individual human wills but of no grand human 
design. 175 
2. Self-organizing dynamics 
We have specified the structures of self-organizing systems: semi-
autonomous networks, comprised of elements, and connections between elements, 
that order system content through the development of forms and the emergence 
173Falk Moore, supra note 165, at 744 45. 
174Shapiro, supra note 123, at 44, 46. Shapiro states that: [S]uch major policies as that of 
private control of timber resources or the allocation of industrial loss to workers rather than 
entrepreneurs are not made and announced by a single court on a single day but are the product of 
a large number of decentralized, nonhierarchical, and differentially motivated decisions by a large 
number of judges, counsellors, pleaders, academic commentators and litigants over long periods of 
time and, for the most part, with no formally defined, continuing relation among the participants 
or their decisions. 
/d. (citation omitted). 
115See, e.g., I F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 39 (1973) 
(providing examples of spontaneous order in nature whereby large number of facts unknown in 
totality influence order). See generally RUDI KELLER, ON LANGUAGE CHANGE: THE INVISIBLE 
HAND IN LANGUAGE, at ix (Brigitte Nerlich trans., 1994) (1990) (applying combination of 
spontaneous order and invisible hand theory to changes in linguistics); BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION 
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, at x-xi ( 1996) (observing that biological and cultural evolution are 
driven by mutation and recombination, which influences social contract). 
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of norms. But how does this self-organization occur? Can we specify the 
dynamics of a self-organizing legal system? 
In natural systems, the ordering of system content involves two processes: 
mutation, which introduces multiple forms into a given system; and natural 
selection, the process by which one or more of these fortns, well-fitted to survive 
the system's environment, become the norm. Similarly, self-organization in a 
legal system involves two processes: ( 1) the innovation of forms, and (2) the 
emergence of norms. 
(a) Form Innovation 
How do forms get into a system? Where does system content come from? 
Many forms come from the creative strategies of particular system actors. 176 
Lawyers, for example, attempting to achieve some client objective, will 
reconfigure existing apparatus to some innovative end or otherwise generate a 
novel legal position. 177 
Other forms are transmitted into one system after having originated in 
another system. 178 I shall refer to this method of form innovation as 
transportation-cum-distortion. A substantial body of socio-legal research on 
"dispute transfortnation"179 has shown that conununications of meaning undergo 
176See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 
DUKEL.J. 1405, 1407-13 (2000) (highlighting role of lawyers elaborating "strategic" theory of legal 
innovation: locating creative element in legal systems in bar rather than bench); Mark C. Suchman 
& Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes 
in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY679, 679 (1996) (discussing strategies of Silicon Valley 
lawyers). 
117See infra Part V.A.2.(a) (giving examples offonn innovation via lawyer creativity, such 
as the pre-packaged Chapter 11 plan). 
178M ore can be said about this process of fonn transportation. For example, it is possible that 
the fonns that are transported are typically robust, having achieved a nonnative status in the sending 
system; e.g., sophisticated valuation techniques (qua fonn), widely used in business networks, are 
gradually transported into legal networks (see infra Part V .A.2.(b )(i) discussion of discounted cash 
flow models). Also, we may be able to say that the network actors through which fonns are 
transmitted inter-system are often weakly tied, in that they are not central (i.e., not strongly tied) to 
either the business network or the legal network. This would suggest an important role for low-
status actors (the trial courts in legal systems) in the process of innovation. 
179 See Trubek, Where the Action Is, supra note 63, at 621 (''[D]ispute transformation [explores 
how] the nature, intensity, and trajectory of social conflicts are affected by the intervention of 
various actors, including lawyers." (citation omitted)). See, e.g., William L.F. Felsteiner et al., The 
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming .. . , 15 LAW & Soc'v 
REv. 631, 632 ( 1980-81) (providing "a framework within which the emergence and transfonnation 
of disputes can be described"); Susan Staiger Gooding, Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities 
in United States v. Oregon, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservationt Plaintiff-Intervenor, 
28 LAw & Soc' Y REv. 1181, 1181 ( 1994) ("[E]xplor[ ing] the socially and culturally based identities 
at stake in a current treaty rights case and the mediation of these identities within a framework of 
legal rights."); Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation 
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changes as they move between actors from various systems (e.g., from family 
actors or business actors to legal actors). In another context, the legal sociologist 
Gunther Teubner has developed a similar notion. Describing the 
"'interdiscursivity,"180 Teubner observes in systems of "legal pluralism" (i.e., the 
overlapping: or semi-autonomous networks comprising the structures of a self-
organizing system), 181 that: 
The dynamics of legal pluralism cannot be understood by a 
common logics of the discourses involved, be it the transaction 
economics of law and organization, the politics of omnipresent micro-
power, the socio-logies of social control, or yesterday's political 
economy. Rather, it is the radical diversity of discourses the internal 
rationality of the organization, the exigencies of the market, the 
idiosyncracies of personal interaction, and the intrinsic logics of diverse 
public and ~'private" legal orders that are responsible for distorted 
communication in legal pluralism. 182 
The intersystem dynamic of forn1 transportation-cum-distortion runs both 
ways. For example, a business system (e.g., a firm or a set offirn1s) may import 
a set of directives about, say, employment discrimination, from legal systems 
(e.g., courts or administrative agencies), and may even import procedural 
apparatus (such as grievance connnittees sitting as intra-organizational dispute 
resolution devices) from legal systems. In the process of receiving and 
implementing these legal forms, however, the firn1 will stylize them to fit the 
of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 775,775 (1980-81): 
Our aim in this paper is to suggest the usefulness of the concept ~transformation of a 
dispute' in ( 1) improving our understanding of how people manage processes of 
disputing and (2) showing how law and other normative frameworks are articulated, 
imposed, circumvented, and created as people negotiate social order in their 
transactions with one another. 
; David M. Trubek, Studying Courts in Context, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 485,487 (1980-81) (using 
dispute focused approach in studying role of civil courts). An example of dispute transformation, 
which also illustrates the fact that there are multiple and different networks within a single legal 
system, is the way that the framing of a case changes as it works its way up the appellate chain: 
usages and techniques familiar to (and perhaps originating from) extra-legalnetworks (e.g., business 
firms or families) are gradually boiled down to pure doctrinal considerations recognizable only to 
a lawyer. 
180Teubner, supra note 72, at 1453. 
181 See supra Part IV. C.l (discussing self-organizing structures). 
182Teubner, supra note 72, at 1456 (emphasis added). Teubner suggests that "'legal phenomena 
[emerge] in the context ofhighly specialized discourses ... which the law then misreads as sources 
ofnonn production.'' /d. at 1457. See generally Clune, supra note 66, at 74 (developing model for 
understanding implementation of laws and regulation wherein mutiple levels of interaction amongst 
various stakeholders influence outcomes). 
538 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2004: 483 
firrn's particular environment and business goals. 183 Running in the other 
direction, a legal system may import a technique or argument that is in play in an 
extra-legal system (e.g., a business conm1unity or a civil rights community), but 
tailor its implementation in ways specific to the legal environment. 184 This process 
of creative miscommunication contributes to the generation of the variable fortns 
that comprise system content. 
A special case of transportation-cum-distortion occurs in systems (such as 
legal systems) that have a hierarchical structure: a network of hierarchically 
superior actors will sometimes direct a fortn into a network of hierarchically 
inferior actors, and that form will be effectively rejected by the hierarchic 
inferiors. This pattern of"ukase-rejection" was explained by Malcolm Feeley and 
Edward Rubin, in their important book on judicial policymaking and prison 
reform. 185 Exploring the relationship between appellate courts and fora of first 
instance, Feeley and Rubin suggest that the appellate courts' task of consolidating 
doctrine is typically nothing more than "coordination,"186 i.e., appellate courts take 
notice of the ways that trial courts resolve a problem and, in a sense, follow their 
lead. 187 Appellate courts, under this model, speak most effectively when they echo 
a conclusion already worked out among the various trial courts. 188 
Appellate courts stray from simple coordination when they face what Feeley 
and Rubin call a "ukase." A ukase is a hierarchical superior's attempt to order 
system content in a way that displaces the self-organizing already in progress 
183 See PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 32 passim ( 1969); Lauren 
B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process 
in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401, 1406-17, 1435-37 (1990); see also Teubner, 
supra note 72, at 1453-54 (discussing movement of legal standards to implementation by 
organization). 
184See infra Part V.A.2 (noting case study of lien-stripping and empirical evidence on 
bankruptcy valuation are examples of transportation-cum-distortion of forms from business to legal 
networks). 
185FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125, at 226-52. See also Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1989, 1991 (1996) (presenting theory of judicial 
lawmaking). 
186Coordination takes place "either horizontally or vertically; that is, it either emerges from 
the collective actions of various institutional actors or it is imposed by the leaders of the institution." 
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125, at 229. See id. (describing "collective action" attributed to 
horizontal coordination as three-step process). Feeley and Rubin's process of "horizontal 
coordination" is, in the vernacular of this Article, a form of self-organization. According to Feeley 
and Rubin, an example of "vertical coordination" is the appeal, and especially the consolidating 
effects that a U.S. Supreme Court declaration allegedly has upon the practice of law in a targeted 
area. See id. at 231. 
187 /d. 
188 See id. ("(M]ost major Supreme Court cases represent the culmination of a coordination 
process that began horizontally, among the federal trial and appellate courts. While this pattern is 
far from universal, it is much more common than is generally assumed."). 
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among hierarchical inferiors. 189 Feeley and Rubin claim that "[ c ]reating doctrine 
precipitously, without waiting for the coordination process to generate a solution 
that seems relatively continuous with preexisting legal doctrine, is thus the 
situation that would raise the most serious legitimacy problems."190 
Hierarchically inferior actors will often give the ukase a cool reception. 191 
Feeley and Rubin note that even when a hierarchically superior court expressly 
directs a legal fortn at inferior courts (via the ukase) the form may sometimes be 
effectively rejected by the inferior courts. 192 
Summarizing the process of fortn innovation: (1) much fonn innovation 
occurs via the creative strategizing of system actors (e.g., lawyers); (2) fotrns are 
also innovated by being transported-cum-distorted from, for example, a business 
network to a bankruptcy trial network (i.e., from an extra-system actor to a system 
actor); (3) a special case of the transportation-cum-distortion process in 
hierarchically structured systems involves the ukase-rejection pattern, in which 
a hierarchically superior actor (e.g., an appellate court) directs a ukase at an 
inferior actor, which then effectively rejects that ukase. These devices of forn1 
innovation may explain much of the variable system content that we observe. 
189 I d. at 246. ("Our ... judiciaries ... are ultimately hierarchical, headed by a supreme court 
whose decisions possess authoritative force. This creates the possibility ... that the jurisdiction's 
supreme court will dispense with the coordination process and operate by ukase."). Of course, this 
Article offers a substantial qualification to the claim that "our judiciaries are ultimately 
hierarchical." Hierarchy reigns but does not rule. 
190/d. at 247. Note how Feeley and Rubin's account of the institutional condition of hierarchy 
turns the conventional account of hierarchy on its head. For commentators such as Bussel and 
Epstein, a functioning pyramidal and hierarchical structure is a sine qua non for a legitimate legal 
system. See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing hierarchic aspects of appellate review in bankruptcy). For 
Feeley and Rubin, a legal system is never closer to illegitimacy than when it orders content via 
hierarchical command. See also Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical Analysis 
of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 Mo. L. REv. 101, 104-11 (1997) (highlighting benefits of 
"percolation'' before case is taken by U.S. Supreme Court). 
1911t is unpredictable how a ukase sent from one network will actually affect the target. Falk 
Moore concludes that many attempts to affect social life through legislation or other deliberate legal 
means have unpredictable outcomes because the nonns issued by the state (in the fonn of social 
welfare legislation, for example) encounter and must interact with nonns already in place in the 
fields that are the target of the legislation. See Falk Moore, supra note 165, at 742-45. Some of the 
notnts of the "sending field" are adopted by the "receiving field," some are substantially modified, 
and some are simply ignored. /d. at 719-20. 
192ln the cases where the U.S. Supreme Court tries to issue a ukase, it is possible that the lower 
courts will reject the spirit of the suggested doctrinal change by limiting the ukase to its facts. See 
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125, at 231-32 (recounting Jones v. Alfred H Mayer, Co., in which 
U.S. Supreme Court tried clever theory of Thirteenth Amendment for discrilJlination by private 
persons). While ''[t]he decision itself was clever, ... it served no coordinating role for the lower 
courts [and] they ... regularly rejected any claims ... that went beyond the precise facts of the 
Jones case." /d. (citations omitted); see infra Part V.A.2.(a) (discussing Dewsnup v. Timm). 
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(b) Norm emergence 
Now we turn our attention from forn1s to norms~ Having explored the origin 
of a system's variable content (analogous to the theory of mutation in 
evolutionary explanations of natural systems), we now ask the question: by what 
process do some of these forms emerge as normative?193 
The obvious answer in legal systems is that norms emerge via hierarchical 
command, because the Supreme Court (or the President, or the Congress, or the 
final rule-making body of an administrative agency) said so. This is a sort of 
ordering ex machina. But we have seen that hierarchical mechanisms of ordering 
are under-explanatory, and we are challenged to explain the order that is 
unexplained by 'hierarchical command. How does system content self-organize?194 
In natural systems, the mechanism of self-organization is called natural 
selection forms fittest to the particular environment survive and come to 
characterize the system. In social systems (specifically, the legal systems we 
consider here), we also need a principle ofjitness to the environment that explains 
the process ofnorm emergence. Fitness in nature often involves attributes such as 
size, strength, speed, coloration, or intelligence. One principle of fitness in a legal 
system may be redundancy. 
To· explain, it is useful to review some of the work of Martin Shapiro, a 
political scientist who grappled with the problem ofhow ordering occurs in a legal 
system that lacks significant hierarchical properties. 195 Shapiro explored the 
"organization" that produces tort doctrine. 196 He defined a network with "fifty-two 
tops": the highest court of each state system, the highest court of the federal 
system, and an aggregation of the British courts that produce tort doctrine. 197 
Shapiro wrote: 
If each of these fifty-two tops were relatively independent for tort 
purposes, we would simply have a good case for comparative study of 
comparable decision~ making organizations similar to a study of fifty-
two super market chains. What makes tort so interesting for the study 
of organizational policy-making, however, is that there are not fifty-two 
bodies of tort policy but in a very real sense a single body of Anglo-
American tort law that runs throughout England and the United States, 
with local variations to be sure, but with a remarkably uniform core. 
193Recalling the algebraic forn1ulation: What is the relationship between variable system 
t . t (. _ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO n) d ·d d t · t t (A. -con en a Ec - j.J , p. , J..l , jJ , j.J, , j.J, , j.J, , p, , p. , J.l , ... Jl an or ere sys em con en Y-' Ec -
. 1 1 I l 2 I l l l l 1 )? . J1 ,p, ,p ,p ,j..t ,p ,p ,p, ,p, ,p ' .. ·J.l . 
194See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 1, 13-17 
(2001) (identifying and describing different actors that challenge and help develop notms). 
195Shapiro, supra note 123, at 44. 
196/d. at 46-47. 
197 /d. at 50. 
No.2] SELF-ORGANIZING LEGAL SYSTEMS 
The puzzle is how fifty-two appellate decision-makers, none legally or 
politically subordinated to any of the others, arrive at such a unified 
body of policy. 198 . 
541 
Summarizing the problem, Shapiro asked: "[H]ow do a large number of 
decision-makers manage to arrive at well-coordinated policy decisions (policy 
decisions are the output of this organization) when the organization is bereft of all 
the mechanisms of hierarchical control that we associate with classical 
organizational structures?"199 The progression of Shapiro's resolution of the 
problem is worth quoting at length: 
[O]ur attention is immediately drawn to communications phenomena. 
A logical first guess would be that the organization [i.e·., the tort-policy-
producing organization with the fifty-two tops] has developed some set 
of special communications techniques that allow its decision-makers to 
cooperate to substitute, somehow, mutual influence for command 
from above. Because of the large number of decision-makers, an.d the 
very large volume of decisions necessary to keep tort policy attuned to 
a changing society, we would expect these conununications techniques 
to absorb a disproportionately large share of the organization's 
resources. In fact ... we find a vast body of communications personnel. 
The litigational market assures that thousands of lawyers will devote 
their energies to carrying messages from one· court to the next, keeping 
each informed of what the others are doing. This flow of 
communications is not co·ntrolled by conscious plan or carefully 
structured communications networks, but rather by hundreds of 
thousands of individual decisions guided by the desire for personal 
profit. I use the term litigational market precisely because I wish to 
suggest an "invisible hand." For this market, like Adam Smith's, has 
many rules and conventions that harness individual greed to a higher 
cause. Under the rules of the game, the lawyer-communicator has the 
highest chance of winning if he can show a court that his client must 
prevail if the court keeps doing exactly what it has been doing; the next 
highest chance if he can persuade the court that it should do exactly 
what some other court has been doing; the next highest chance if he can 
convince it to do something slightly different from what it or some other 
court has been doing; and the worst prospect if he must argue that the 
198/d. at 50-51. One should note that a study of fifty-two independent supermarket chains 
would very likely demonstrate a coordination in pricing similar to the coordination Shapiro 
observed in doctrine, for many of the same reasons. 
199Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory ofStare Decisis, 1 j. LEGAL STUD. 125, 130 (1972). 
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court should do something markedly different from what it and other 
courts have done in the past.200 
Shapiro describes a semi-autonomous network (i.e., the area of intersection 
between courts and the bar) governed by the fitness principle of redundancy, 
whereupon the judge wants to rule in a way that is consistent with prior court 
rulings and the litigator wants to convince the judge that, if the judge acts with the 
wonted redundancy, it means victory for the litigator's client.201 Redundancy is 
the grammar of litigation, just as courtesies and reciprocation are the grammar of 
sales, and formal planning and recording are the grammar of legal/compliance. 
Every action taken or strategy proposed is evaluated, and its relative value 
determined, by referring to the criteria of redundancy. 202 
Shapiro's concept of the "litigational market" helps explain the process of 
non-hierarchical norm emergence. Litigators want to win. And they know that 
courts judge arguments as winners or losers based, at least in significant part, on 
the principle of redundancy. 203 Courts, for their part, base the resolution of cases 
on the "messages" that litigators carry "from one court to the next"204 Litigators 
200 /d. at 131 (emphasis added) .. Shapiro presents a social scientific analysis of what every 
judge and litigator instinctively knows: lawyers work for the court, virtually as an extension of court 
personnel; the success and prestige of a litigator is directly proportional to the degree to which she 
comes to be perceived as a trusted advisor to the judge. 
201 Shapiro presents a theory of the maintenance of system content (i.e., judges want to render 
decisions that will not stick out) and a theory of the change of system content (i.e., judges can be 
coaxed into m~king what Shapiro refers to as "cybernetic changes, so long as they approximate 
"syntactic continuity''). See id. at 133-34. 
202In evolutionary terms, one can say that the environment rewards redundancy, and that an 
argument's fitness corresponds to its degree of redundancy. The really interesting question, of 
course, is how redundancy came to define the environment. In legal and social systems, purely 
naturalistic explanations (e.g., "you gotta swim fast around here because otherwise you will get 
. . 
eaten by that shark'') are unavailable. See, e.g., ISSAC D. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL 
REPRESSION: BLACK REBELS BEFORE THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTS, atxii (1973) ("[T]he form 
ofrepression is even more important than the ... concrete severity ofthe sanctions which emanate 
from [the] fonn .. ~ ."). See also David M. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal 
Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 529, 
529 ( 1977) (review of Balbus book). 
203Redundancy is the principle of fitness from the viewpoint of the bench as well as the bar. 
See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125; at 242., The authors state that: 
[C]oordination involves the conscious decision to displace one's own efforts at 
integration with an integrative effort that can be communicated to, and followed by, a 
large number of dispersed individuals within the judiciary. For an idea to coordinate 
individual judges' integration processes, it must be continuous with existing_ legal 
doctrine; that is, it must be perceived by judges as a natural outgrowth of that doctrine, 
rather than a radical departure. 
!d. Accord Shapiro, supra note 199, at 133 (discussing "cybernetic feedback" and "syntactic 
feedback"). 
204Shapiro, supra note 199, at 131. 
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thus connect points in the network that might otherwise remain distant.205 
Litigators bear into court messages such as, "a court like yours over in Arizona 
has adopted this particular theory of contributory negligence, and you should 
adopt it too, your honor." Moreover, litigators carry these messages not because 
they hanker after some system-wide doctrinal coherence, but rather because they 
want to score a client victory and collect the big fee. Yet from this hodgepodge 
of motivations, institutional constraints, and individual actions, system content is 
ordered and nortns emerge. 
V. APPLICATION AND EXTENSION 
A. Bankruptcy as an Example of a Self-Organizing Legal System 
The self-organizing model elaborated in the previous Part establishes the 
following: (1) the structure of self-organizing systems is characterized by 
networks containing actors related to each other by ties of varying strength; and 
(2) the dynamics of self-organizing systems involve (a) a process of form 
innovation, including strategic choices by system actors and the transportation-
cum-distortion offorn1s from other systems, and (b) a process of norm emergence 
whereby fonns most fit to the system's environment come to characterize the 
system. This Section applies the self-organizing model to bankruptcy law. 
,,. 
' I. Self-organizing structures: bankruptcy networks 
Figure 6 represents a networks-based model of the bankruptcy legal 
system.206 As Figures 4 and 5 depict a business finn's communities overlapping 
with each other and with extra-firm conununities, Figure 6 depicts the same 
structural relationships as played out in the bankruptcy legal system. 
205 See, e.g., STROGA TZ, supra note 170, at 249 (providing example of how "small-world 
architecture apparently fostered global coordination more efficiently"); W A TIS, supra note 170, at 
3 7-42 (explaining small-world problem). 
206This figure could be filled out a bit more. There is an important set of networks engaged 
in bankruptcy policymaking, including Congress, lobbyists, commentators, etc., that substantially 
overlaps with the communities represented in Figure 6. See Clune, supra note 66, at 55-57 
(contrasting downward cycles wherein policy is fot rned, deployed, and acted upon, with upward 
cycles wherein insiders and outsiders impact policymaking). The figure could also represent that 
most of the "Commentators" community is engaged primarily in analyzing the doctrine produced 
by the appellate networks, with only a relatively small group of scholars interested primarily in the 
activities of trial networks. See id. 
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The inset (represented at the bottom of Figure 6) magnifies a portion of the 
networks using the "graph theory" utilized in Figure 5. The inset shows the 
relationships between four specific actors, initially located in three different 
groups: Judge Martin in "Bankruptcy Courts," clients Feldstein and Wagner from 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation in "Clients," and attorney VanSicklen 
in "Members of the Bar and Other Legal Professionals." These four actors are 
No.2] SELF-ORGANIZING LEGAL SYSTEMS 545 
connected by ties of varying strength: strong ties connect Martin to VanSicklen 
and Feldstein to Wagner, and a semi -strong tie connects Wagner to VanS icklen. 207 
Figure 6 illustrates a few specific points. First, note that the various actors in 
a given system stand in a position of mutual influence. Contrary to conventional 
imagination, the targets of legal regulation are not subordinated to the 
regulators rather, the dynamic between regulators and targets of regulation is 
more "back-and-forth" than "top-down."208 
Note also that Figure 6 represents trial and appellate networks side-by-side, 
rather than the conventional imagination of trial networks operating below 
appellate networks~ This representation rejects hierarchical imagery and suggests 
that trial and appellate networks are, in some sense, coequal each with 
independent access to authority and each executing separate but related 
functions. 209 
While the trial and appellate networks are substantially coequal, they are also 
substantially different. Figure 6 represents the trial and appellate groups as two210 
distinct but cooperating networks. What delineates the difference between these 
two networks? One conventional answer is that the trial network is engaged 
primarily in the administration of benefits and burdens, while the appellate 
network is interested mainly in the pronouncement and consolidation of 
doctrine.211 But this characterization is partial and misleading. The trial network 
makes a sustained and regular effort to announce doctrine, and the appellate 
network shows occasional interest in the administrative tasks of bankruptcy (at 
least when it attempts to justify its positions on policy grounds). Fact versus law 
distinctions are similarly under-explanatory. 
I suggest that a chief distinction between trial and appellate networks lies in 
their preeminent means of ordering. While appellate networks occasionally self-
207Note that these four actors constitute a separate network for the purposes of a given 
transaction, i.e., a network in actus. In any living system, manifold networks in actus spring up 
spontaneously. Some are fleeting, others endure. 
208In his important work on implementation, Bill Clune observed that governmental regulation 
is often initiated by the targets of regulation (e.g., the private businesses subject to the regulation), 
and that all regulation exhibits more of a "back-and-forth" dynamic than a "top-down" dynamic. 
See id. at 74; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance 
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406,412-45 (1999) (discussing how private finns 
subject to legal regulation actively construct tenns of their own compliance). 
209See infra Part V.A.2.(a) (providing example of how trial and appellate courts execute 
separate but related functions). 
210There are, of course, many more than two bankruptcy networks. There are at least 326 trial 
networks (one for each bankruptcy court) and at least twelve appellate networks (one for each U.S. 
court of appeals that takes bankruptcy cases), plus manifold and shifting combinations, each 
yielding its own, perhaps fleeting, network in actus. Figure 6 presents the "ideal types" of this mass 
of networks. 
211See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17, 
28 (1981) (describing central court as imposer of uniforn1ity). 
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order (e.g., an appeals court deciding a question of first impression), and trial 
networks often bear the imprint of hierarchy, such instances are uncharacteristic. 
The typical means of ordering is hierarchical for appellate networks and self-
organization for trial networks. 
For bankruptcy's appellate networks,212 the hierarchical model does explain 
much of ordering. Hierarchical mechanisms succeed in ordering appellate system 
content mainly because of small numbers the sheer amount of actors and data 
to be managed is relatively low. The smaller number of courts and decisions in 
appellate networks makes it possible to intend, and even occasionally to achieve, 
a semblance of system-wide consistency. The prototype of deliberate hierarchical 
ordering is, of course, the U.S. Supreme Court. Because there is only one court 
to consider (making the sheer amount of relevant data relatively low), the U.S. 
Supreme Court can, and does, pursue consistency as one of its chief goals.213 
When you can count all the relevant data on your fingers, there is no need to look 
past the obvious to answer the question: "What orders system content?" 
Bankruptcy's trial networks, on the other hand, order content in a complex 
environment of large numbers. The study of bankruptcy trial networks214 directs 
our attention past hierarchical models of ordering and towards a more complex 
model of self-organization. 
2. Self-organizing dynamics: empirical evidence 
This Subsection presents evidence of form innovation and norm emergence 
in bankruptcy. Beyond listing specific instances of fortns and potential nortns that 
comprise some of the bankruptcy system's variable content, I will present ( 1) a 
detailed case study of a particular fortn (called lien-stripping) that demonstrates 
important features of the process of form innovation, and (2) quantitative evidence 
from a substantial database of valuation opinions that suggests certain norms have 
emerged non-hierarchically. 
212The bankruptcy appellate networks would include at least the judges and court staff, 
lawyers, clients, and commentators acting in the vicinity of the U.S. Supreme Court, the twelve U.S. 
courts of appeals commonly hearing bankruptcy cases, and the various district courts hearing 
bankruptcy cases. 
213Note, for example, the degree to which the U.S. Supreme Court engages in fictions of 
continuity (e.g., claiming "this Court held in 1946," when in fact no one on this Court was a 
member of "this Court" in 1946) when justifying its positions. 
214The bankruptcy trial networks would include at least the judges, court staff, lawyers, 
clients, near-clients, non-clients, and commentators acting in the vicinity of the 326 U.S. bankruptcy 
courts. 
• 
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(a) Form innovation: a case study 
Form innovation abounds. The forms that make up the vast and variable 
content of the bankruptcy system are generated primarily by the creative action 
of actors such as attorneys215 (trying to achieve client objectives) and judges216 
(receiving or rejecting attorneys' arguments). Examples are numerous/17 and 
would include such cleverly named devices as the "Chapter 20,"218 the "pre-
pack, "219 and the "liquidating 11. "220 
Sometimes, however, the legal actor is more transmitter than creator of an 
innovation. Fortns are occasionally imported from extra-legal systems (e.g., 
cormnercial systems of debt collection) to the bankruptcy system. These forms 
become distorted as they move from extra-legal systems to legal systems 
(transportation-cum-distortion),221 and between trial networks and appellate 
215See supra text accompanying notes 195-203 (discussing Shapiro's "litigational market"); 
LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 176, at 1405-06. 
216See supra text accompanying notes 185-92 (discussing Feeley and Rubin's insights on 
creation of legal doctrine). 
217Some examples of content variation in bankruptcy, in addition to those already mentioned 
supra text accompanying notes 77-93, include: (1) whether separate classification of student loan 
creditors in a Chapter 13 plan is "unfair discrimination" under section 1322(b )( 1 ). In re Gonzales, 
206 B.R. 239, 241-42 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997) (listing twenty-five cases with different results); (2) 
whether attorney's fees accrued post-petition by unsecured creditors are allowable as claims against 
the estate under section 506(b). United Merch. & Mfr., Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of 
the U.S. (In reUnited Merch. & Mfr., Inc.), 674 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1982), Tri-State Homes, Inc. 
v. Mears (In re Tri-State Homes, Inc.), 56 B.R. 24, 25-26 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); (3) whether 
exemptions planning, without more, is extrinsic evidence of fraud. First Texas Savings Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986,990-92 (5th Cir. 1983), Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveton, 
848 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1988); (4) whether "implied representation" states a theory under 
section 523(a)(2). LA Capitol Fed. Credit Union v. Melancon (In re Melancon), 223 B.R. 300, 305 
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1998), AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 732 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); (5) what constitutes "undue hardship" in dischargeability of student loans. 
McGinnis v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re McGinnis), 289 B.R. 257,264 65 (Bankr. 
M.D. Ga. 2003), In re Pace, 288 B.R. 788, 791-92 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003). 
218 A Chapter 20 occurs when a consumer debtor files under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
successively, obtaining the full benefits of both chapters. This debtors' strategy was expressly 
blessed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991). As an 
example of the ukase-rejection pattern, supra text accompanying notes 185-92, Chapter 20 
strategies are still rejected by some bankruptcy courts despite the blessing from the pinnacle of the 
federal hierarchy. See LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 43, at 1534-36. 
219 A pre-packaged bankruptcy occurs when a finn negotiates a plan of reorganization prior 
to filing a petition under Chapter 11. See, e.g., Pre-Petition Comm. of Select Asbestos Claimants 
v. Combustion Eng' g, Inc. (In re Combustion Eng' g, Inc.), 292 B.R. 515, 517 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) 
(describing debtor's pre-packaged plan). 
220 A liquidating 11 occurs when a debtor-in-possession files a plan that would liquidate, rather 
than reorganize, the firm. See, e.g., In re Rickel & Assocs., Inc., 260 B.R. 673, 674-75 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing liquidating plan filed by debtor). 
221See supra text accompanying notes 180-83 (discussing Teubner). 
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networks within legal systems (the ukase·rejection pattem}.222 This intersystem 
and inter-network friction contributes to the variable system content (i.e., the 
multiplicity of fom1s) that we observe in bankruptcy legal systems. 
A case study illustrates these features of transportation-cum-distortion and 
ukase-rejection. I will track the movement of a particular form, known as lien-
stripping, through the following steps: (1) the origination of the forrn in the extra-
legal system of commercial debt collection; (2) the transportation of the form from 
that extra-legal system to the trial networks of the bankruptcy legal system; (3) the 
distortion of the form incident to its transportation; (4) the development, by trial 
network actors, of practices designed to ameliorate problems caused by the 
distortion; (5) the transportation of the form from trial networks to appellate 
networks, where the U.S. Supreme Court, in Dewsnup v. Timm,223 issued a ukase 
against the form; and (6) the effective rejection of that ukase by bankruptcy's trial 
networks. 
At the outset, I note that I recount the saga of lien-stripping and Dewsnup not 
to make a policy point.224 This Article does not focus on whether lien-stripping is 
good or bad. The lien-stripping story merely provides an example of the 
interaction among various types of networks and the interpenetration of their 
respective forms. The case study of lien-stripping gives us a feel for the semi-
autonomous structure of networks, and illustrates the dynamics of transportation-
cum-distortion and ukase-rejection that characterize form innovation in self-
organizing systems. 
I shall define lien-stripping first as a market strategy and then as a legal 
strategy. In either case, the basic effect of a lien-stripping strategy is to define a 
debt (typically by bi.furcating the debt into two parts) based upon a valuation of 
the collateral. 
• 
222See supra text accompanying notes 185-92 (discussing Feeley & Rubin). 
223502 U.S. 410 (1992). See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 4 79, 516-2 0 ( 1997) (noting Dewsnup instance of"shared mental model" operated 
well at trial level, but was misunderstood at appellate level). 
224The nonnative evaluation of forms often follows on the he·els of objective empirical work 
that identifies the importation of fonns from beyond the legal system. See, e.g., Marianne B. 
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 709, 711-13 (1999) ("[U]ndertaking empirical research to learn how frequently 
Chapter 7 debtors reaffinn, which debts they reaffinn, how much they agree to pay, and whether 
they can afford it."). The important work by Culhane and White demonstrated a practice in which 
unsecured lenders pressure debtors to reaffinn debts that otherwise would have been discharged in 
bankruptcy. Legal actors have explicitly targeted this practice (qua form, in the vernacular of this 
Article) for elimination as a matter of good policy. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing policy 
approaches to doctrine) . 
• 
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At market, suppose a bank lends a debtor $15,000 and secures225 the debt by 
taking a security interest in the debtor's car, which is worth $13,000. If the debtor 
defaults on the loan, the relevant commercial actors (i.e., the bank and the debtor) 
can typically do one of two things that would effectively divide the $15,000 debt 
into two parts, based upon the value of the car. First, the debtor could surrender 
the car to the bank, which could then sell it and realize the $13,000 market value 
(less the costs of liquidation). The bank, contractually owed $15,000, would 
continue to have a claim against the debtor for the $2000 balance, but that claim 
would be unsecured and the bank would have to resort to state law collection 
remedies (e.g., garnishing the debtor's wages, seizing the debtor's assets) to 
collect the unsecured portion of the debt. In the alternative, the bank can repossess 
and liquidate the collateral, realizing the same result (i.e., $13,000 in its pocket 
and an outstanding unsecured claim for $2000).226 
At law, suppose the debtor files for bankruptcy protection, and the bank 
claims it is owed $15,000 and has a lien in the car. Often, the bankruptcy court 
will order that the car be left with the debtor. The court will then perform a 
valuation of the car, finding, say, the value to be $13,000. The court will then 
bifurcate the bank's claim into two parts: a $13,000 claim that will be treated as 
secured and thus receive certain statutory privileges that heighten the chance of 
repayment, and a $2000 claim that will be treated as unsecured. 
Both at market and law, the essence of lien-stripping is that a debt is defined 
(typically by being bifurcated into two parts) based upon a valuation of the 
collateral. At market, the valuation is by exchange; at law, the valuation is 
performed judicially. At market, the debtor will often lose the car; at law the 
debtor often keeps the car. But the basic content of lien-stripping remains the 
same, whether performed at market or at law: the initial debt is defined in two 
parts based upon a valuation of the collateral. 
The strategy oflien-stripping arose commercially, among actors in the world 
of debt collection, and was transported to the bankruptcy legal system as a remedy 
at law.227 Many debtors file for bankruptcy expressly to take advantage of lien-
225 A lender's claim against a borrower is secured when the lender has taken, and the borrower 
has given, a property interest (known as a security interest or a lien) in an item (known as 
collateral) typically held by the borrower. A common example of a secured claim is a mortgage, 
which gives the lender a right to foreclose on the borrower's house if borrower defaults on the loan. 
226The threat of repossession is a most effective debt-collection tool for car lenders. Typically, 
the car lender's collection efforts are greatest during the period right after it makes the loan, when 
the loan-to-value ratio is most unbalanced and the lender is most at-risk if the debtor chooses to 
default. 
227The U.S. Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes lien-stripping, in at least the following: § 
506, § 722, §1123(b)(5), § 1322(b)(2), and plans under Chapter 12. 
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stripping, and commentators regard lien-stripping as serving basic bankruptcy 
goals.228 
But the form's transportation has also worked the form's distortion, and has 
led to problems in the way that lien-stripping is implemented by legal actors. The 
creditor and the debtor (stripped of their bargaining bluffs) will admit that the 
creditor is entitled to a secured claim worth the value of the collateral. The real 
question about lien-stripping comes at the point of valuation: if the secured 
portion of the debt is to be pegged to the value of the collateral, how does one 
determine the value of the collateral?229 In the nonlegal system of commercial debt 
collection, the problem of valuation is settled by exchange an item is worth what 
it sells for. Problems arise when the collateral is valued by some process other 
than an actual exchange or market transaction. Distortion is introduced when a 
scheme of commerce is founded (as our commercial scheme certainly is) on the 
assumption that exchange settles value, and then rights of commercial parties are 
modified by a law that allows something besides exchange to settle value. 
Bankruptcy law allows a legal valuation of property to substitute a market 
valuation of that property, and the potential spread between those two valuations 
is the primary concern with lien-stripping. 
Returning again to our example of the $13,000 car: suppose that the judicial 
valuation230 sets the value of the car at $10,000, even though everybody knows 
that the exchange value of the car would be closer to $13,000. Maybe the judge 
just makes a mistake. Or maybe the judge is pursuing some goal other than 
verifying the ex ante market expectations of the bargaining parties (e.g., goals 
such as wealth redistribution, or establishing the debtor's fresh start). Now the 
creditor is clearly getting less than tt would have bargained for. 
As it turns out, however, the problem of the potential spread is a quandary 
more abstract than actual. When applying a lien-stripping remedy, actors in 
bankruptcy's trial networks have developed multiple techniques designed to peg 
the collateral's value to an actual exchange value: 231 the collateral is judicially 
valued incident to an actual sale at which the exchange of the collateral (or 
comparable property) took place. This exchange value is precisely what the 
secured creditor countenanced when it made the loan and took the lien, and is no 
more or less than it would have gotten at a full and fair bargaining ex post. 
228See, e.g., Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of 
Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373,419-420 (1991) (arguing that elimination of lien-stripping 
is bad policy and is contrary to Congress' concern with creditor misbehavior). 
229See Barry E. Adler, Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, I 0 BANKR. DEV. J. l, 13 
( 1993-94) (implying that valuation is linchpin of lien-stripping). 
230That is, a ruling pursuant to a section 506(a) hearing. 
231See LoPucki, supra note 223, at 517 n.l65 (indicating that section 725 allows for 
distribution of collateral directly to secured creditors during course of bankruptcy, and section 
363(t) allows court to sell property during course of bankruptcy, thus finding exchange price). 
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Lien-stripping thus illustrates both the process of transportation-cum-
distortion that characterizes form innovation, and the means of ameliorating 
distortion that is developed by the system receiving the fortn. Conscious of the 
importance in allowing lien-strips at a price that is close to (or inforn1ed by) 
exchange value, trial networks developed norms of vague flexibility designed to 
capture the usefulness of lien-stripping while mitigating (or perhaps justifying on 
independent grounds) its excesses and potential problems. 
The lien-stripping story also illustrates the ukase-rejection pattern of 
distortion in the interactions between the trial and appellate networks of 
bankruptcy's legal system. In Dewsnup, the U.S. Supreme Court scrutinized the 
practice oflien~stripping as it flourished in the trial networks,232 The Court looked 
at the intricate apparatus carefully developed by the trial networks to adapt a 
useful commercial form to legal purposes, and saw instead something that looked 
like an illicit "taking" of property. 233 Once alerted to the alleged "problem of the 
potential spread," the Court dealt with it in the manner common to appellate 
networks: it issued a categorical and peremptory ukase234 banishing the practice 
of lien-stripping.235 In the classic fashion of signaling a complete lack of 
confidence in its declaration, the Court limited its holding to the facts of the case 
for no particularly principled reason.236 
Trial networks responded to the ukase by continuing the practice of lien-
stripping virtually unabated in every context except the one specifically enjoined 
232Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,413-14 (1992). 
233 According to the Court in Dewsnup, lien-stripping would 
freeze the creditor's secured interest at the judicially determined valuation. By this 
approach, -the creditor would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the 
property by the time-ofthe foreclosure sale. The increase would accrue to the benefit 
of the debtor, a result some of the parties describe as a "windfall." 
!d. at 41 7. This particular conception uf the problem of the potential spread is, as LoPucki points 
out, base~ on a set of misunderstandings about what actually happens in a bankruptcy. See LoPucki, 
supra note 223, at 517-18. In the Supreme Court's imagination, there is the section 506(a) judicial 
valuation of the property, followed by a large time gap during which the property's value might 
appreciate, followed finally by a foreclosure (i.e., an actual sale of the property establishing an 
exchange value) at which it is shown that the section 506(a) valuation was too low and the debtor 
nets a windfall. Dewsnup, 502 U.S~ at 417. In the real world, however, the foreclosure may not 
happen at all. If it does, and if the nature of the property and the conditions of the market suggest 
that there might be an appreciation, the_ court and parties have access to ample techniques that will 
avoid any time gap or creditor's loss of appreciation. See LoPucki, supra note 223, at 517-18. 
· 
234See supra Part IV.C.2.(a) (Feeley and Rubin discussion of the "ukase"). 
235Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-20. Contrary to the popular view of the U.S. Supreme-Court as 
a group of superheroes standing astride the law, one is almost inclined to characterize the Court in 
Dewsnup as a dim giant who blunders upon a mass of delicate machinery and, not liking what it 
does not understand, smashes it all to bits before grunting contentedly and moving on. 
236/d~ at 416-17 ("We ... focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their 
legal resolution on another day."); id. at417 n.3 ("[W]e express no opinion as to whether the words 
'allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code_."). 
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by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dewsnup,237 and otherwise "channel[ing] 
strategically-minded debtors into alternative strategies that reached the same 
result, though probably with higher transaction costs. "238 
The lien-stripping saga demonstrates how bankruptcy's trial and appellate 
networks often seem to be going about their business separately. They are 
concerned about different matters, employ different methodologies, even speak 
different languages. 239 Sometimes the hierarchically inferior trial networks will 
effectively reject an express command of the hierarchically superior appellate 
networks. 240 
237That is, use of section 506( d) to lien strip in a Chapter 7 where the collateral is real estate. 
238LoPucki, supra note 223, at 518 (citation omitted). 
239See id. at 516. LoPucki states that: 
In the traditional view, the United States Supreme Court stands at the pinnacle of the 
United States legal system. As cases make their way through the . . . court 
• 
system ... the most important issues become the subjects of appeals. They can reach 
the Supreme Court only if the Court agrees that they are of a certain level of 
importance. This system of appeals is generally considered to have as one of its goals 
uniform interpretation of the Constitution, statutes, and other legal doctrine. From the 
perspective of participants in the many law-related systems that can fall subject to 
Supreme Court review, the view is quite different. Supreme Court intervention in any 
particular system is quite rare. When it occurs, the Supreme Court brings to the task a 
virtually complete lack of expertise in the system and applies methods unlikely to 
enlighten it. ... [T]he Court is a wild card, striking unexpectedly and focusing not on 
the system but on some highly specific facet of it. The Supreme Court's 
methods principally interpretating statutes and applying precedent place the focus 
on petty distinctions in wording, history, and fictional intentions. 
I d. (citation omitted). 
24
°Compare Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 (1997) (establishing 
alleged valuation standard for reorganization cases), with In re Lyles, 226 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tenn. 1998) ("[T]he Glueck case presents the proper method of valuing collateral."); In re Glueck, 
223 B.R. 514, 519 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998) ("Rash .. . did not provide a definitive starting point."); 
In re Oglesby, 221 B.R. 515,518-19 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) ("The Oglesby case is a good example 
of the diverse positions parties assert while using the same Rash replacement-valuation standard."); 
In re Younger, 216 B.R. 649, 653 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (outlining problems with Rash 
decision). Compare Bank of Am. Nat' I Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 
434, 43 7 ( 1999) (providing that new value exception to absolute priority rule could be instituted in 
. 
an auction environment), with In re Dow Coming Corp., 287 B.R. 396, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2002) ("The Court finds 203 N. LaSalle is inapplicable to the issue before the Court."); In re Zenith 
Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 106 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) ("It is not appropriate to extend the ruling of 
the 203 North LaSalle case beyond the facts of that case."). Compare Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 
36, 52-53 ( 1986) (holding restitution orders nondischargeable in Chapter 7 case), with Dep't ofPub. 
Welfare v. Johnson-Allen (In re Johnson-Allen), 69 B.R. 461,462 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1987) (holding 
restitution orders dischargeable in Chapter 13 case). Compare Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 14 (2000) ("We conclude that 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) does not provide 
an administrative claimant an independent right to use the section to seek payment of its claim."), 
with Official Comm. ofUnsecured Creditors v. Pardee (In re Stanwich Fin. Servs. Corp.), 288 B.R. 
24, 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002) (rejecting respondent's argument which was based on Hartford 
Underwriters). Avellino and Bienes v. M. Frenvilfe Co. (In reM. Frenville Co.), in which the court 
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More generally, the life of the form called lien-stripping illustrates important 
phenomena associated with form innovation, specifically the processes of 
transportation-cum-distortion and ukase-rejection. 
Turning from forms to nortns, we now explore whether bankruptcy legal 
systems contain evidence of non-hierarchical norm emergence. 
(b) Norm emergence: quantitative evidence 
A form becomes a norn1 when it comes to characterize system content. In 
hierarchically ordered systems, norms happen by fiat when a hierarchically 
superior actor selects a particular fonn. It is this mere act of selection (followed 
by subsequent acts of obedience by hierarchically inferior actors) that makes a 
nortn. 
In self-organizing systems, nonns emerge through a complex process of 
selection. 241 Sometimes norms emerge when actors imitate a particular innovation 
known for its excellence at resolving a problem. An example of this sort of nonn 
emergence is the spread of''fast-track" procedures for small business bankruptcies 
that were developed in the Eastern District ofNorth Carolina. This particular form 
has spread to many other jurisdictions.242 This sort of innovation, without 
defined claim narrowly~ 744 F.2d 332, 337-38 (3d Cir. 1984), is an example of a court of appeals 
ukase that was universally rejected by bankruptcy courts. See also David Gray Carlson, Surcharge 
and Standing: Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) After Hartford Underwriters, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
43,44 45 (2002) ("Hartford Underwriters therefore continues the Supreme Court's recent losing 
streak in its attempt to legislate rules for bankruptcy proceedings. In truth, the bankruptcy process 
has a dynamism of its own that simply will not tolerate unworkable mandarin decrees from on 
high." (citations omitted)). Additionally, Sniadach v. Family Financial Corp., where the Court 
concluded that a state wage garnishment statute violated Due Process, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969), 
and Fuentes v. Shevin, holding that state replevin statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment; 407 
U.S. 67, 96 (1972) present two instances where it is unclear whether the U.S. Supreme Court's 
imposition of heightened constitutional requirements upon state debt collection remedies actually 
changed the practice of debt collection ''on the ground." See generally Walter F. Murphy, Lower 
Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 1017, 1021-30 (1959) (detailing 
how lower courts use procedural or interpretive devices to circumvent general policies advanced 
by Supreme Court decisions); Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to 
State Courts Since 1941, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (1954) (examining cases in which, on 
remand, lower court evaded Supreme Court's mandate). But cf Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court 
Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. Svs. J. 208, 208 
(1978) (claiming U.S. Supreme Court'scapacity to lead judicial system may be considerably greater 
than the existing research indicates). 
241See supra Part IV.C.2.(b) (discussing emergence of norms). 
242 See Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles 
in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 
74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 190 n.86 (2000). Ponoroff states that: 
By now, most bankruptcy professionals are familiar with the 'fast-track' procedures 
pioneered by Judge A. Thomas Small, Jr. in the Eastern District of North Carolina to 
streamline and expedite the process for small businesses. Judge Small did lobby 
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legislation (or other hierarchical command), demonstrates the adaptive properties 
that characterize self-organizing systems. 
More general evidence of the adaptive activities of bankruptcy's trial 
networks comes to us from Daniel Bussel's study of bankruptcy opinions that 
were subject to "legislative vetoes" by the U.S. Congress.243 One significant 
finding of Bussel's work was that a large proportion of the court cases that 
received the corrective attention of Congress emanated from bankruptcy courts, 
rather than the more hierarchically superior appellate courts. Bussel writes: 
While it may in part reflect the law professor's tendency to focus on 
appellate decisions, I was surprised by [the fmding that Congress acted 
to "veto" decisions rendered by bankruptcy courts]. I imagined that 
bankruptcy court decisions would have very low visibility with the 
Congress and that those adversely affected by bankruptcy court 
decisions would be far more likely to appeal or relitigate the issue in the 
next case than to seek an amendment from Congress. 244 
Bussel's alleged anomaly (i.e., that Congress would bother to veto the 
interpretations ofhierarchically inferior courts) is, of course, completely resolved 
by the self-organizing model: actors in bankruptcy's trial networks regularly 
develop administrative techniques and other forms. Some of these forms take hold 
and spread to other bankruptcy trial networks, achieving a sort of normative status 
even in the absence of external direction. Occasionally, one of these forms may 
make the jump to, and receive the (often unwelcome) scrutiny of, an appellate 
network.245 Much more frequently, the forms (including those forms that may 
have achieved the status of nortns) of bankruptcy's trial networks remain un-
appealed.246 Yet these forms, despite being the creation of hierarchically 
insignificant courts, affect both the disposition of a large number of cases and the 
allocation of a large number of dollars. For this reason, forms generated by 
bankruptcy's trial networks receive the attention, including the negative attention, 
of Congress when it sets about the task of revising or clarifying the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. 
My own empirical research on bankruptcy valuation, which occasioned the 
theoretical exposition offered in this Article, also contains evidence of emergent 
!d. 
Congress to codify a special reorganization chapter, but the failure of Congress to 
respond has not impeded the efforts of Judge Small to adapt the present statute to the 
needs of particular types of cases and Judge Small's model has been followed across 
the country. 
243Bussel, Failures, supra note 39, at 889. 
244/d. at 918. 
245See supra Part V.A.2.(a) (discussing lien-stripping). 
246 See supra Part II.B (discussing appeals problem in bankruptcy). 
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nortns in bankruptcy's trial networks regarding some aspects of valuation in 
business cases. 247 From this quantitative database on bankruptcy valuation, I offer 
three examples of the entry of fortns into the bankruptcy legal system and the 
possible emergence ofnortns over time, (1) debtors' use of discounted cash flow 
valuation models, (2) debtors' use of valuation models based on comparables, and 
(3) creditors' overall valuation standard. Note that all three figures represent 
descriptive statistics for the published cases from 1979-1998. I make no 
inferential claims with these data. 
• (i) Debtors' use of discounted cash flow 
Figure 7 charts and graphs the means representing debtors' use of discounted 
cash flow ("DCF") models248 over time.249 Figure 7 also displays a ''trendline" to 
accent the general flow of the data. 
2471n an empirical study funded by grants from the National Conference ofBankruptcy Judges 
and the American Bankruptcy Institute, I have compiled and statistically analyzed two substantial 
databases (one covering consumer exemption cases, the other covering business cramdown cases) 
ofU.S. bankruptcy court opinions covering the twenty-yearperiod from 1979 through 1998. I shall 
report more fully on the findings in two forthcoming publications: Bernard Trujillo, Valuation in 
Business Cramdowns (forthcoming); Bernard Trujillo, Valuation in Consumer Exemption Cases 
(forthcoming). The source of the next three figures is my "business cramdown" database: all 
bankruptcy court opinions reported by Westlaw from 1979 through 1998 containing valuation issues 
under Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b ). Specifically, the database contains all cases in the Westlaw 
library FBKR-BCT responding to the search term "51 K3563 51 K3564 51 K3565 & DA(AFT 1978 
& BEF 1999)" (yield: 388 cases) and which contain one or more numerical valuations of an asset 
by the bankruptcy court (total observations: 180). A case is a "cramdown" under section 1129(b) 
when the court considers confinning a plan of reorganization despite the fact that a class of creditors 
has voted against the plan. In order to cram a plan down the throats of a class of dissenting creditors, 
certain "cramdown rights" of the dissenting class must be respected, which cramdown rights entail 
a judicial valuation of the creditors' claims.§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), (A)(iii), (B)(i). 
248 A discounted cash flow model estimates the present value of future expected cash receipts 
and expenditures. The model is typically generated by a financial professional who is introduced 
as an expert witness. The financial expert will estimate the finn's future cash flows and then 
discount those expected future returns to present value through the use of a discount rate. See, e.g., 
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 73-78 (5th ed. 
1996) (explaining conceptual and mathematical application of discounted cash flow analysis for 
business valuation). 
249Cases where the debtor used a DCF model were coded as "I." Cases where the debtor did 
not use a DCF model were coded as "0." The mean represents the average use of DCF models by 
all debtors in a given year. For example, in 1992 the debtor used a DCF model in about forty-three 
percent of the cases (in fifty-seven percent of the cases the debtor did not use a DCF model). For 
clarity of presentation, Figures 7, 8, and 9 do not display years that contain zero or one observation 
of the relevant variable. 
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Figure 7 shows a gentle and steady upward trend in the use of DCF models 
over time. DCF models were relatively rare in 1982, but became fairly common 
by 1998. These data support the interpretation that in the early 1980s, the use of 
DCF evidence, already quite common in business and financial systems, entered 
the bankruptcy legal system and gradually became something of a regular arrow 
in the quiver of debtors in Chapter 11 cases. Sometime after 1985, the use ofDCF 
models in cramdown valuation proceedings became, in the vernacular of this 
article, a regular form available to system participants. 250 
(ii) Debtors' use of comparables 
Figure 8 charts and graphs the means representing debtors' use of 
comparables-based valuation models251 and also shows data for the standard 
deviation over time. 252 
250We might interpret the increased usage of DCF models by bankruptcy courts as a spread 
of"managerial norms" from business networks to legal networks. See generally Lauren B. Edelman 
et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW 
& Soc;Y REv. 497, 51 I (1993) (finding that businesses translate legal directives into managerial 
norms). 
251A valuation model based on "comparables'' estimates an asset's value by looking to the 
known values of other, ostensibly similar, assets. See, e.g., MARK GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, 
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 368 (1998) (mentioning use of comparable risk-
adjusted discount rates from other fnms to value project investment opportunites ). 
252The standard deviation represents how widely the values are dispersed from the mean. A 
high standard deviation represents that the mean was achieved by averaging widely disparate 
numbers (e.g., two values ofO and 100 have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of70. 71). A low 
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Figure 8 shows steadily rising means and declining standard deviations from 
1984 until 1993. From 1990 through 1993 the means are extremely high and the 
standard deviations are extremely low, indicating that comparables valuation 
models were robustly normative during those years. These data support the 
interpretation that during the early 1990s it became a system characteristic for 
debtors in Chapter 11 cramdowns to offer comparables-based valuation models. 253 
In the vernacular of this Article, comparables valuation models entered the legal 
system in the early 1980s as a form. For the period from the late 1980s and mid-
1990s, comparables become a norm of the legal system. 
(iii) Creditors' valuation standard 
Figure 9 charts and graphs the standard deviation of the creditors' valuation 
standard over time, and also shows a "trendline" that accents the flow of the 
data.254 
standard deviation represents that the mean was achieved by averaging numbers that are close 
together (e.g., two values of 49 and 51 have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 1.41 ). Cases 
where debtor used a comparables valuation model were coded as "1." Cases where debtor did not 
use a comparables valuation model were coded as "0." 
253The low standard deviations in Figure 8 indicate that the high means were achieved by 
averaging uniformly high numbers, i.e. the use of comparables was high across the board from 1990 
to 1993. If it was 1992 and you were a judge hearing a cram down, and the debtor did not produce 
comparables, you would have said: "What's going on?" One should note that the system change in 
favor of comparables coincided with the valuation of property in cases filed during the recession 
of the early to mid-1990s. As the value of property (and particularly real estate) declined, debtors 
(who are typically eager to get low valuations for their property in a cram down hearing) would 
adduce evidence drawn from the valuation of comparable properties (which values would be 
depressed because of the recession). 
254The valuation standard is a variable I constructed to measure the parties' and court's 
general approach to the valuation. The valuation standard variable describes a continuum between 
two poles: one pole is extreme "common" value and the other pole is extreme "individual private" 
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Figure 9 shows a pronounced shrinkage of the standard deviation, indicating 
that the variation in the ways creditors approach valuation has diminished 
markedly over time. This is a vivid example of 11-0n-hierarchical ordering. The 
data support the interpretation that, in the early years, right after the enactment of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978, creditors were all over the map in the ways 
they talked about valuation. As the years wore on, creditors' valuation strategies 
have become less variable and more ordered. And this ordering has occurred 
across multiple parties in multiple jurisdictions, all without the command-and-
control of a hierarchical mechanism. 
Summarizing the data: Figure 7 (DCF models) suggests the entry of a 
business form into the legal system and the spread of that form within the legal 
system. Figure 8 ( comparables models) suggests a form entered the legal system 
.... 
value. A person proceeding from a "common" valuation standard typically intends to re-sell the 
asset after acquisition,-and bases her own valuation of the item upon her understanding of the item's 
re-sale value. A person working with an "individual private'' valuation standard intends to acquire 
the item for her own use or consumption, and so bases her valuation Qf the item upon her own 
anticipation of gains from using or consuming the item. These two polar conceptions of value are 
dr~wn from the economics literature on "auction theory." See PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION 
THEORY TO WoRK 157, 162 (2004) (discussing "common" and "independent private" conceptions 
of value). See generally R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan; Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 699, 704--()5 ( 1987) (discussing independent .. private_ value model and common value 
model); Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 
ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1090, 1097 ( 1982) (explaining independent-private values model and general 
symmetric model); Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 3, 
14-16 (1989) (explaining how value of goods is determined). The variable was coded on a scale of 
1 to 8, with "1" representing extreme common value and "8'' representing extreme "individual 
private value." 
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and gradually spread to the point of achieving normative status. Figure 9 
(creditors' valuation standard) suggests that creditors' valuation strategies have 
become more ordered over time, despite the absence of exogenous or hierarchical 
control. These data lend support to the claim that at least some of what we observe 
in the bankruptcy system is self-organizing. 
B. Self-Organization as a General Model of Trial Court Behavior 
There is evidence that at least some substantial part of the content of our 
bankruptcy legal system is self-organizing. In this final Section, I suggest that 
bankruptcy law may not be unique. Fields of law as diverse as the law of crimes 
and misdemeanors, tax law, and immigration law may also demonstrate properties 
of non-hierarchical ordering and informal adaptation.255 I have presented 
bankruptcy as a case study that illustrates the principles of self-organization, but 
there is reason to believe that self-organization may extend beyond bankruptcy. 
I offer that the self-organizing model might be a general theory of the ordering of 
legal content, helping to explain basic phenomena common to all trial courts (or 
other fora of first instance, such as administrative decision makers) regardless of 
the particular substantive areas oflaw.256 Undoubtedly, much of what we observe 
in law is hierarchically ordered, and much is not ordered at all. But I want to 
suggest that traces of self-organization may exist in areas of law beyond 
bankruptcy. In the spirit of setting an agenda for future research, this Section will 
briefly mention three basic problems of legal scholarship that the self-organizing 
model may illuminate: discretion, doctrine, and legal change. 
1. Discretion 
\ 
Scholars and politicians often color the discretion of judges and other 
. decision makers as a problem to be solved. The self-organizing model, on the 
contrary, suggests that discretion is little more than a background condition for the 
dynamics of problem-solving. 257 A passage from Peter M. Blau is instructive: 
255Variation and adaptive system behavior are endemic; "[ t ]he major defect in [the precedent] 
system is a mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it." Llewellyn, supra note 53, at 396 
(emphasis added). 
256Self-organizing dynamics will also appear in appellate court networks where a judge is 
deciding an issue of first impression. In such instances, the judge typically will select a few cases 
(which she may describe as the leading cases or the better reasoned cases) as guides, while 
simultaneously declining to be influenced by other cases that, at least fot mally, are similarly 
situated. 
257See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299, 1299 
( 1997) (suggesting that judicial discretion is presented as "problem," when it is actually ubiquitous 
and unremarkable feature of modem law); Rubin & Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, supra note 
185, at 2037 ("[Judicial creation oflaw] can be described, understood, and justified. It is one of the 
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(I]t is still often assumed that the rational pursuit of bureaucratic 
objectives requires that most members of the organization virtually 
abstain from exercising rational judgment in the perforn1ance of their 
duties. . . . But these considerations ignore the complexity of many 
bureaucratic responsibilities and the need for change in operating 
techniques. . .. [E]fficiency depends on recurrent modifications of 
operating methods and is adversely affected by the time lag between the 
appearance of operational difficulties and the official establishment of 
remedies. In contrast, if every official is expected to be concerned with 
the rational accomplishment of organizational objectives, ... necessary 
adjustments will spontaneously emerge in work groups, and far more 
rational operations become possible.258 
For those focused on tracing the authorizing pedigree of legal commands/59 
discretion (and especially the discretion ofunelectedjudges) is a central problem. 
But for descriptions of complex systems and their adaptive and self-organizing 
properties, discretion is epiphenomenal. 
2. Doctrine 
Legal scholarship takes doctrine very seriously. The thrust of most legal 
research is concerned with getting the best doctrine: rule or standard?260 Property 
rule or liability rule?261 Let-the-market-work or help-the-weaker-party?262 
Lawyers study doctrine either because we think doctrine is intrinsically 
important and we care about its analytical consistency (formalism), or because we 
think that doctrine can affect, for good or ill, the policy outcomes that we care 
basic, quotidian elements of our legal system."). . 
258BLAU, supra note 74, at 216-17 (emphasis added). 
259That is, for those scholars undertaking an "ideological" research program, in the sense 
offered by Griffiths. See Griffiths, supra note 6, at 12 ("[I]t would be impossible for a descriptive 
theory to define the underlying ideas of 'difference' and 'sameness' in relation to rules and 
situations, since that is a legal-doctrinal and not an empirical distinction."). See generally Abel, 
supra note 9, passim (distinguishing between "law books" and "books about law"). 
260See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REv. 1685, 1685 (1976) ("[A]ltruist views on substantive private law issues lead to willingness 
to resort to standards in administration, while individualism seems to harmonize with an insistence 
on rigid rules rigidly applied."). 
261See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (discussing legal 
entitlements protected by property rules versus those protected by liability rules). 
262See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 56, at 1051-52 (discussing party's "duty to read" contract 
language before signing juxtaposed with issues of market autonomy versus unfair circumstances). 
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about (realism). 263 These two approaches to doctrine are conventionally presented 
as polar opposites. From the perspective of this Article, however, the formalist 
and the realist approaches to doctrine are substantially continuous264 both study 
doctrine because they care about what it says. That is, both the fortnalist and 
realist approaches to doctrine are content-dependent: the content of the doctrine 
determines the direction of the research. 
This Article, on the contrary, states a position that is agnostic about 
doctrine's specific content. From the point of view of the self-organizing model 
oflegal systems, doctrine (e.g., the formal speech-acts of judges) is just one type 
of system content, alongside other forms of system content such as attorney 
strategies and innovations introduced by businesspersons, civil rights activists, 
and other extra-system actors. A researcher inquiring into self-organizing systems 
cares about system content (including doctrine) not because of what it says, but 
because of what it can show us about the structure and dynamics of the legal 
system and the extra-legal systems with which it intersects. In this view, studying 
system content is important primarily because it provides us with the variables for 
learning about the system's structure and dynamics. Research on self-organizing 
legal systems takes doctrine as data. 
3. Legal change 
How does the content of a legal system change? What explains why certain 
changes occur in a legal system's content, while other changes do not? I believe 
that many important questions in legal research echo these inquiries. 
The self-organizing model gives us the apparatus for beginning an 
exploration. For example, the model puts us in a position to test the hypothesis 
that legal innovations come from low-status networks (i.e., those affiliated with 
trial courts and other fora of first instance), which receive and transport the 
263For policy-impact uses of bankruptcy empirical research, see, e.g., Braucher, supra note 
43, at 582-83 (discussing whether unifotrn application of bankruptcy laws is appropriate policy 
goal); Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 859 (suggesting that legal change should be 
effectuated through educational seminars as well as amendments to fonnal rules). Compare this with 
Griffiths, who writes that "empirical" (in his sense of"non-ideological") approaches to law "must 
be independent of the practical concerns of the administration of state institutions." Griffiths, supra 
note 6, at 23. In other words, the researcher should not engage particular variations (asking "is this 
particular variation good or bad?" "can these variations be smoothed somehow?" or "can we tell 
a story about judicial strategies or biases that will explain away these variations?"), but should 
rather look at variation holistically and, as it \\·ere, from a distance. This distance enables the 
researcher to explore the systemic properties of variation, and ask how variation fits into the entire 
process of ordering. 
264See Galanter, The Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 252 (''I make no distinction between 
believers in the model ofrules and instrumentalists; nor between forn1alist believers in autonomous 
rule development and their realist critics. Thus, where some observers detect a radical break, I see 
a striking continuity."). 
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innovations from outside the legal system. Understanding the self-organizing 
aspects of a legal system, we are put in a position to measure the role of trial 
courts as bridges to extra-legal networks and primary agents of legal change. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article attempts to supplement our maps of legal reality so that they are 
a bit more accurate and useful. A hierarchical map of ordering, the pyramid story, 
does not account well for two prominent realities: (1) variation in the content of 
the legal system, and (2) patterns of non-hierarchical ordering that we observe. A 
more complete map of legal ordering must account for these realities. 
I have offered a model of self-organization to explain what hierarchy cannot. 
Self-organization takes as central the variation that we observe in the content of 
a legal system, and attempts to state how order emerges from that variation. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, variation and order are not categories arranged 
as binary opposites. Rather, variation and order compose one continuous 
phenomenon. · 
Working with bankruptcy data and institutions, I have portrayed self-
organizing structures as overlapping networks of legal and extra-legal actors, and 
I have explained self-organizing dynamics as processes of form innovation and 
norm emergence. I have adduced empirical evidence (including a substantial case 
study and statistical analysis of a quantitative database) to support the proposition 
that U.S. bankruptcy law is a self-organizing system. Finally, I have suggested 
that the self-organizing model might provide a more general theory of trial court 
behavior, and I have offered some preliminary thoughts on how the self-
organizing model may illuminate basic research on discretion, doctrine, and legal 
change. 
• 
